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Mapping the Dimensions of Social Capital

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# Mapping the Dimensions of Social Capital\*

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**Abstract.** We provide a novel survey dataset of a representative sample of the Polish population ( $n = 1000$ ), allowing for a detailed quantification of Bourdieu's (1986) definition of social capital as the aggregate of resources accessible to individuals through their social networks. Based on this data, we create an empirical 'map' of four distinct dimensions of social capital: network degree (number of social ties), network centrality, bridging social capital (ties with dissimilar others), and bonding social capital (ties with similar others, primarily with kin). Construction of the 'map' is based on mutual correlations among the four social capital dimensions as well as their diverse links with immediate outcomes – individuals' social trust and willingness to cooperate – and ultimate outcomes: individual incomes, life satisfaction and happiness.

**Keywords:** social capital, social network structure, social trust, willingness to cooperate, new survey dataset.

**JEL Classification Numbers:** D85, J31, Z13

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# 1 Introduction

The concept of social capital is as popular in the literature as it is ambiguous (Sobel, 2002; Kadushin, 2012; Bjørnskov and Sønderskov, 2013). Scholars have defined it in many conflicting ways – ranging from catch-all multi-dimensional concepts<sup>1</sup> to more refined operationalizations focusing on selected behaviors or norms only – and subsequently used these definitions in their explanations of a variety of economic and social phenomena. This paper follows the strand of literature which views social capital as a relatively narrow term which relates only to individuals’ social networks. More precisely, following Bourdieu (1986) we define social capital as the aggregate of resources accessible to individuals through their social networks.

However, the concept of social capital remains ambiguous even within the literature which takes the network approach to social capital measurement (Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 2000; Lin, 2001). The current study aims to limit the extent of this ambiguity by creating an empirical “map” of four distinct dimensions of individuals’ social capital: (i) network degree (number of social ties), (ii) network centrality, (iii) bridging social capital (ties with dissimilar others), and (iv) bonding social capital (ties with similar others, primarily with kin). While each of the four dimensions has been already discussed at length both from the theoretical and the empirical angle, the key novelty of the current study is to provide new empirical evidence on the character of their interrelation as well as their (separate as well as joint) diverse links with *immediate outcomes* – social trust and willingness to cooperate – and *ultimate outcomes*: individual incomes, life satisfaction and happiness.

The contribution of the current study to the literature is threefold. First, we compile a novel survey dataset of a representative sample of the Polish population ( $n = 1000$ ), which allows us to measure individuals’ network degree, centrality, bridging and bonding social capital.<sup>2</sup> To our knowledge, these concepts have not yet been simultaneously measured empirically. Hence, by providing detailed and statistically

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<sup>1</sup>For example, van Oorschot, Arts, and Gelissen (2006) propose a multifaceted measure of social capital which encompasses (i) social networks (contacts with family and friends as well as participation in organizations), (ii) trust (towards people and institutions), and (iii) civic society values (interest in politics and support of civic attitudes and ethical behaviors).

<sup>2</sup>The survey questionnaire can be found in the appendix. The raw data are available from the authors upon request. Please note that the dataset includes also data on the dynamics of social capital formation, which we don’t exploit in the current paper.


reliable summary scales characterizing the *inner structure* of social capital, we bridge a substantial gap in the literature. Second, based on this unique dataset we identify the mutual relationships among the four social capital dimensions as well as their links with social trust and willingness to cooperate, which we view as key immediate outcomes of social capital. Third, in the final step of our analysis we use multivariate regressions to capture the joint relationship between all six aforementioned variables and the ultimate outcomes: individual incomes as well as life satisfaction and happiness. We carefully control for the simultaneous impact of a wide range of other important socio-economic variables (e.g., education, age, employment status, marital status, town size, etc.). Furthermore, in an attempt to disentangle the effects of social capital working at the individual and community level, we also investigate the role of reference levels of the respective social capital dimensions. We also consider the possibility of interactions between both levels of measurement (i.e., micro–macro interactions). Finally, we also apply a Generalized Additive Model (GAM) specification in order to test for possible nonlinear relationships.

Our key results are as follows. First, an application of reliability analysis to the summary scales constructed from our survey questionnaire confirms that the measurement of the relevant concepts is reliable. We are therefore confident in proceeding to further steps of the empirical analysis.

Second, we find that the four considered social capital dimensions are distinct but interrelated. The signs of correlation coefficients are indicated in Figure 1. Network degree and centrality have a strong tendency to go hand in hand and are also positively related to bridging social capital and negatively – to bonding social capital. Bridging social capital is in turn also positively linked to willingness to cooperate, and bonding social capital – negatively related to social trust.

Third, in a series of multivariate regressions we identify that both social trust and individual willingness to cooperate are strongly positively linked to individual earnings. On top of that, bridging social capital relates positively to earnings, whereas bonding social capital relates negatively; network degree and centrality are statistically insignificant. However, a closer look at these relationships reveals that some of them are in fact nonlinear. Most notably, we find that the relationships between bridging social capital or network degree and individual earnings tend to be inverted

Figure 1: Empirical relationships between the four dimensions of social capital as well as trust and willingness to cooperate.



Notes: ++ strong positive correlation, + positive correlation, - negative correlation, 0 no correlation. Thick lines denote robust correlations, i.e. the ones which survive also when controlling for the simultaneous effects of other social capital dimensions.

U-shaped, cf. [Growiec and Growiec \(2016\)](#).

Next, we find that the social component of individuals' life satisfaction (or, similarly but not equivalently, self-reported happiness) is determined primarily by the number of social ties an individual holds (network degree), whereas other social capital dimensions appear to be insignificant. Finally, community-level effects are typically of minor importance for individual outcomes when compared to the direct effects of individuals' own social capital stocks.

In a separate, companion paper ([Kamiński, Growiec, and Growiec, 2017](#)), we put forward a multi-agent simulation model where individuals are embedded in a social network. Based on local interactions, they form their social trust and cooperation attitudes and apply them in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Our results turn out to be in broad agreement with the empirical findings discussed here and can be interestingly extrapolated to cross-country differences.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the associated literature. Section 3 discusses our novel dataset and outlines the construction of variables used in the empirical study. Section 4 discusses the relations between the four considered social capital dimensions. Section 5 identifies the diverse

links between these dimensions and social trust, willingness to cooperate, as well as individual incomes, life satisfaction and happiness. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Background Literature

Social capital is an ambiguous, complex concept which has been defined in diverse ways in the literature. Our approach to tackling its multidimensional character is to single out its four key dimensions: (i) number of social ties (network degree), (ii) network centrality, (iii) bridging and (iv) bonding social capital. We acknowledge them as interlinked but distinct concepts that are able to form an “inner map” of the overarching social capital concept. In doing so, we make two important assumptions. First, following Bourdieu (1986) and numerous other scholars<sup>3</sup> we leave out the possibility that social capital includes non-network features such as social norms (e.g., social trust, civic society values). Second, we also exclude all possible network-based dimensions of social capital other than these four. While the former choice has been motivated by theoretical considerations, discussed below, the latter is partly also an empirical issue. In fact, our unique dataset allowed us to construct additional social capital measures: subjective local network density, intensity of social interaction, and the individual’s ability to draw from network resources (or specifically, bridging or bonding network resources). These empirical measures however did not turn as useful as the original four.<sup>4</sup>

**Theory.** The current paper adopts the following definition of social capital due to Bourdieu (1986): “social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.” (p. 128). The principal reason for accepting this purely network-

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<sup>3</sup>For example, Bian (1997); Woolcock (1998, 2001); Lin (2001); van der Gaag and Snijders (2005); Burt (2010); van der Gaag, Snijders, and Flap (2012).

<sup>4</sup>This, of course, can mean many things. On the one hand, these auxiliary social capital dimensions may be conceptually flawed; on the other hand, however, it is also quite likely that the empirical measurement in our data was too noisy to uncover their true potential.

based definition, widely shared in sociology (Lin, 2001; Kadushin, 2002; Li, Pickles, and Savage, 2005; Burt, 2005), is that it enables us to precisely delineate people's objective behavior (maintaining social contacts with others) from social norms (trust, cooperation) which we treat as social capital outcomes rather than its dimensions. It is also important that this definition links the social networks people maintain to the resources that may be accessed through them (Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 2001), because access to network resources is vital for the identification of linkages between social capital and individuals' earnings or subjective well-being.

While Bourdieu's definition of social capital provides a useful theoretical frame for our study, it does not precisely specify the inner structure of this concept. "The aggregate of the (...) resources which are linked to possession of a (...) network of (...) relationships" could be affected by a range of network features. First of all, it should be expected that, at least on average, more resources should be available to individuals who maintain more social ties.

Secondly, in line with the "structural holes" argument due to Burt (1992), relatively more resources should also be available to the individuals who form a bridge between otherwise separated sub-networks (cliques) because they are crucial for the flow of information and all other resources in the network. By exploiting structural holes, individuals may gain a unique position in their network and use it for their benefit. In fact, from Burt's empirical research we know that the position of a "bridge" in a network – between two or more dense clusters – is even more beneficial than the position of a "star" in the very center of such a cluster. The reason is that in the information acquisition process, "stars" are typically flooded with redundant information (Burt, 2005, 2010), whereas "bridges" have simultaneous access to a few qualitatively different sources. They can link and bridge people in an organization, and thus are critical in the cooperation between, e.g., different departments of a firm, or more generally – in the allocation of network resources.

Thirdly, the associated literature<sup>5</sup> points out that the access to network resources is also largely affected by the distinction between bridging social capital (social ties with dissimilar others) and bonding social capital (social ties with similar others), as first proposed by Putnam (2000). Both types of social ties are related to different re-

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<sup>5</sup>See Growiec (2015) for an overview.

sources, serving different purposes, and thus they should be viewed as conceptually distinct dimensions of social capital and not just opposite sides of the same spectrum. Ties with similar others are formed to satisfy the safety drive (the need for affiliation, emotional support, etc.) whereas ties with dissimilar others – the effectiveness drive (towards personal development, professional success, etc., [Bowlby, 1969](#); [Greenberg, 1991](#); [Kadushin, 2002](#)). It is therefore conceivable that some individuals may maintain a lot of social ties and yet have little bridging social capital (if these ties do not provide access to valuable “efficiency-related” resources) as well as little bonding social capital (if they are not helpful in terms of safety and support).

Given that social ties help individuals access useful information and, more generally, mobilize the resources embedded in their social networks, the extent and structure of these social networks is very important for individuals’ life chances and possibilities. While some individuals may benefit from being a central node of a large, diverse network of acquaintances, others may be trapped by the limitations of their social networks (which may be underdeveloped, locally dense, and embed scarce or inadequate resources): “structure is always both enabling and constraining” ([Giddens, 1984](#), p. 169).

**Empirical measurement.** Although many of the theoretical definitions of social capital invoked in the literature – including the one discussed above – relate directly to the structure of social networks, empirical studies have typically relied on heavily simplified operationalizations, largely due to the problems with availability of sufficiently detailed data. In particular, to the best of our knowledge the empirical literature thus far has lacked a study which would simultaneously quantify both structural characteristics of a social network (such as individuals’ degree and centrality) as well as the bridging and bonding social capital content of these social ties. The advantage of our dataset is that it permits to go beyond the operationalization of social capital by a very limited number of proxy measures such as the number of often contacted friends and family members (e.g., [Growiec and Growiec, 2010](#); [Kroll, 2011](#); [Leung, Kier, Fung, Fung, and Sproule, 2011](#)), the importance of family / strength of family ties (e.g., [Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2003](#); [Sabatini, 2009](#); [Alesina and Giuliano, 2010](#); [Growiec and Growiec, 2014b](#)), membership in voluntary organizations (e.g., [Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2003](#); [Winkelmann, 2009](#); [Kroll, 2011](#)) or having found one’s job through



social contacts (e.g., [Mouw, 2003](#); [Franzen and Hangartner, 2006](#)). Apart from assessing the number of social ties the individuals hold (network degree), we also devise a novel survey measure of their network centrality as well as quantify their stocks of bridging and bonding social capital. In particular, we capture the diversity of individuals' social ties using the Bridging Social Capital Questionnaire constructed by [Growiec \(2015\)](#).<sup>6</sup>

**Social capital, trust and willingness to cooperate.** Social trust and willingness to cooperate are the key channels through which social capital may influence the economic performance and psychological well-being of individuals and societies. Indeed, according to [Granovetter \(2005\)](#), social networks affect economic outcomes for three main reasons: they affect the flow and quality of information (even if it is subtle, nuanced and difficult to verify), they are an effective source of reward and punishment, and they are therefore a context in which trust can emerge. Moreover, social relations and the trust which emerges through them are the main factors responsible for the creation of generalized social trust in the society. This, in turn, has far-reaching consequences because trust is “essential for stable relations, vital for the maintenance of cooperation, fundamental for any exchange and necessary for even the most routine of everyday interactions” ([Miształ, 1996](#), p. 12). Moreover, trust allows people to reduce the perceived complexity of the social world and the uncertain future events ([Luhmann, 1979](#)).

At the same time, social networks are also the usual context in which people learn to cooperate with one another ([Field, 2010](#)), which then affects their willingness to cooperate with strangers. Social trust and cooperation are related but not equivalent channels of social capital's impact on individuals because willingness to cooperate more often is a behavioral interpretation of the concept of trust than the other way round: “Cooperation is seen as a by-product of trust rather than a source of trust and, moreover, a lack of cooperation can be a result of other factors (such as lack of sufficient information) rather than an absence of trust” ([Miształ, 1996](#), p. 17).

As the formation process of trust and cooperation happens in a social network, characteristics of this network can have an impact on the outcomes. Dense networks

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<sup>6</sup>Similar but less detailed operationalizations have been used by [Hurlbert, Haines, and Beggs \(2000\)](#) and [van der Horst and Coffé \(2012\)](#).

– which tend to be formed among similar individuals due to the homophily principle (the like-me hypothesis, cf. Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954; Lin, 2001) – lead to relatively greater conformity to the norms (Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 1948) but are also relatively less conducive to social trust. This is because dense networks facilitate reputation formation and social control which are functional substitutes of social trust (Dasgupta, 1988). Conversely, less dense networks, which are more likely to embed more bridging social capital resources provided by contacts with dissimilar others as well as contain more “structural holes” and bridges between separate cliques, convey relatively less information about the reputation of other people in the network and are less efficient in imposing social control. That is why members of such networks need more social trust to engage in cooperation. However, social ties within such a network are more likely to provide non-redundant, potentially useful information, thus increasing the expected payoff of prospective cooperation (Granovetter, 2005).

Finally, the extent and structure of individuals’ social networks also affects the magnitude of transaction costs they face, the possibility of implementing innovative (but risky) ideas in cooperation with others, and hence the individuals’ overall cooperativeness and thrift (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Florida, 2004; Klapwijk and van Lange, 2009).

All these social capital outcomes have been found to be empirically important not only individually but also at the community and country levels, permitting to hypothesize that societies which form diverse, inclusive networks of the “small world” type should be more trustful and more willing to cooperate, and thus exhibit better economic performance, than societies which are permeated by visible and invisible barriers, fragmenting the networks into locally dense cliques of individuals who think alike and have similar sets of information and other resources. Empirical evidence at the macro level, while plentiful for the links between social trust, cooperation and economic performance (see e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Algan and Cahuc, 2010), is however scarce when the social network structure is concerned as the explanatory variable (Kamiński, Growiec, and Growiec, 2017).

**Social capital, earnings and subjective well-being.** The linkages between social capital and economic performance or self-reported well-being have been studied at the level of individuals, communities, regions and whole countries. The identified cor-

relations and causal links may vary depending on the considered empirical operationalization of the social capital concept but are typically positive; a broad overview of these results can be found in [Durlauf and Fafchamps \(2005\)](#).

More specifically, at the macro level it has been found that bridging social capital, as opposed to bonding social capital, goes together with civil liberties and the support for gender and racial equality, and strengthens the functioning of democracy by reducing corruption ([Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993](#); [Putnam, 2000](#)). On the other hand, “bonding social capital (as distinct from bridging social capital) has negative effects for society as a whole, but may have positive effects for the members belonging to this closed social group or network” ([Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2003](#)). [Beugelsdijk and Smulders \(2003\)](#) proceed to show empirically that bridging social capital accelerates whereas bonding social capital retards economic growth across European regions.

At the micro level, [Granovetter \(1973\)](#) found that weak ties (i.e., ties between dissimilar people) are more helpful for finding a job than strong ties (between similar people). Social relations with one’s acquaintances have also been found to be positively related to upward mobility in the workplace and individuals’ wages ([Podolny and Baron, 1997](#); [Słomczyński and Tomescu-Dubrow, 2005](#); [Growiec and Growiec, 2010](#); [Zhang, Anderson, and Zhan, 2011](#)). However, as indicated by [Mouw \(2003\)](#) and [Franzen and Hangartner \(2006\)](#), the positive effects of bridging ties on incomes are not always warranted, and social networks may in fact be relatively more important for the non-pecuniary characteristics of the job, like better career perspectives. These doubts have been further strengthened by [Sabatini \(2009\)](#) who found that the positive effect of bridging social capital on earnings is not robust when one allows for regressor endogeneity, and by [Growiec and Growiec \(2016\)](#) who found the relationship between these variables to be inverted U-shaped.

Results on the income effects of bonding social capital are markedly more negative. Negative wage effects of bonding ties have been identified by [Franzen and Hangartner \(2006\)](#); [Sabatini \(2009\)](#); [Kim \(2009\)](#) whereas several other studies (e.g., [Growiec and Growiec, 2010](#); [Zhang, Anderson, and Zhan, 2011](#)) found them to be approximately neutral.

As far as well-being measures are concerned, [Winkelmann \(2009\)](#) and [Kroll \(2011\)](#)

found a positive effect of participation in voluntary organizations. Most importantly, however, a wide range of studies confirmed the importance of maintaining frequent social interactions, both with similar and dissimilar others, for individuals' life satisfaction and happiness (e.g., [Alesina and Giuliano, 2010](#); [Kroll, 2011](#); [Leung, Kier, Fung, Fung, and Sproule, 2011](#); [Growiec and Growiec, 2014b](#)).

Complementary to these results, some authors have also studied the possible benefits of certain locations in the social network. Possessing “structural holes” in one's network (missing links among acquaintances) has been found to be positively related to individuals' creativity, social trust, economic performance and happiness ([Burt, 2005](#)). Network centrality, in turn, has been found to have positive effects for individuals' economic performance ([Granovetter, 2005](#); [Kadushin, 2012](#)) and happiness ([Christakis and Fowler, 2009](#)).

Following the indications of this background literature we have developed a survey questionnaire that allows us to comprehensively measure individuals' social capital and analyze its relationships with trust, willingness to cooperate, incomes and subjective well-being.

## 3 Data

### 3.1 The Novel Dataset

The novel dataset supplied with this paper covers a representative sample of the Polish population aged 15–75. The data has been gathered based on computer-aided personal interviews (CAPI) in May 2015 by Millward Brown SA. The survey questionnaire, designed by the authors of the current study, consisted of 40 questions, some of which contained multiple items. It took approximately 15–20 minutes to complete the survey. The sample size is  $n = 1000$  respondents. The full questionnaire is available as an appendix to this paper.

### 3.2 Construction of Variables

Based on the answers to the detailed survey questions, we have constructed a number of summary scales, capturing the relevant theoretical concepts. We have carefully

tested the reliability as well as validity of each scale. The definitions and empirical characteristics of the respective measures are discussed below. We begin with the four key social capital variables, singled out for detailed investigation based on the implications from the associated literature: network degree, centrality, bridging and bonding social capital. Next we discuss the immediate outcomes of social capital variables: social trust and willingness to cooperate, as well as their more indirect outcomes: earnings, life satisfaction and happiness. In the end, we also comment on the important socio-demographic control variables.

In the course of the study, we have also constructed a range of auxiliary social capital measures, providing additional insights as well as cross-checks to verify the results based on the main four dimensions of social capital. The discussion of these dimensions is relegated to the appendix, whereas detailed correlation and regression results – which do not overturn our main results but are often inconclusive – are available from the authors upon request.

### 3.2.1 Social Capital Dimensions

- **Network degree (number of acquaintances).** The number of social ties an individual holds is the most fundamental characteristic of her social network because it directly determines the degree to which the person may have access to various network resources. However, individuals often face troubles in recalling their exact number of acquaintances when asked directly. Therefore in our empirical operationalization of network degree we combine four proxy measures of this number in a unique summary scale: (i) the reported number of acquaintances contacted during the last week (P2), (ii) sum of reported total numbers of acquaintances from family, from work, and other acquaintances, (P3\_TOTAL), (iii) sum of total reported numbers of persons from family, work, and other acquaintances contacted during the last 7 days (P4\_2ABC), (iv) sum of total reported numbers of persons from family, work, and other acquaintances contacted during the last month (P4\_3ABC). The standardized Cronbach's alpha coefficient of the summary scale **Degree** (based on standardized items) is equal to 0.8588 and cannot be increased by removing any of its constituent items. We use log degree in our regressions.

- **Network centrality.** Theoretically, the “structural holes” argument due to [Burt \(1992\)](#) underscores that individuals forming a bridge between otherwise separated sub-networks (cliques) are crucial for the flow of information and resources in a network and can therefore expect to draw certain advantages from their central location. To reflect this argument, we have constructed our novel empirical measure of individuals’ network centrality based on their reported ability to act like a bridge between otherwise disconnected sub-networks. The measure can also be interpreted as having preferential access to valuable network resources (but not necessarily making use of them). It is based on a 7-item summary scale capturing whether the respondent knows people with valuable skills, people who can help “get things done”, whether the respondent is a person who can help others get a job or solve a difficult work-related problem, whether he/she actually has helped someone get a job or solve a difficult work-related problem, whether he/she often contacts his/her acquaintances with one another, whether he/she shares information obtained from other sub-networks (i.e., acts as a bridge in information diffusion), and whether he/she shares information on job seekers, vacancies, and business opportunities (**Bridge\_Net**, based on P14\_4567–P15\_123). The standardized Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of this scale amounts to 0.7757 and scale reliability cannot be improved by removing any of its items.

To link the above empirical definition with the theoretical definition of centrality (e.g., eigenvector centrality) in networks ([Bonacich, 1972](#)) which is based on the evaluation of influence of the node in the network, individual levels of network centrality, **Centrality**, are computed as a product of **Bridge\_Net** and **Degree**. In our regressions, we use log centrality.

- **Bridging social capital.** Theoretically, the concept of bridging social capital refers to forming social ties across social cleavages and requires people to transcend their simple social identity ([Putnam, 2000](#); [Leonard, 2008](#)). Therefore, as its empirical operationalization we use a measure of trait heterogeneity within one’s network of acquaintances. It is a summary scale based on [Growiec \(2015\)](#) Bridging Social Capital Questionnaire,<sup>7</sup> encompassing 8 items related to main-

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<sup>7</sup>For detailed justifications of the choice of specific items for this scale, please consult the book by

taining social ties with dissimilar others – people of opposite gender, largely different age, with a different level of education, other interests, different worldview, living far away, a lot poorer/wealthier, or from distant family (**Bridging**, based on P24). Its standardized Cronbach’s alpha coefficient amounts to 0.8488 and scale reliability cannot be improved by removing any of its items.

- **Bonding social capital.** Theoretically, the concept of bonding social capital refers to forming social ties within relatively impermeable confines of one’s family and groups of close friends (Putnam, 2000). Hence, as opposed to bridging social capital, these are typically social ties with people holding a similar socioeconomic position. We further narrow down the original Putnam’s theoretical concept to kinship ties only (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010; Growiec, 2015), in line with the presumption that “kin ties are a conservative measure of strong ties” (Tian and Lin, 2016, p. 123). Consequently, we measure individuals’ bonding social capital as the reported percentage of family members among all people contacted during the last week (**Bonding**, based on P4\_2ABC). Furthermore, as robustness checks we also consider three alternative variants of this variable: (i) the percentage of family members among all people contacted during the last month (based on P4\_3ABC), (ii) the percentage of family members among all declared acquaintances (based on P3\_1 and P3\_TOTAL), (iii) the percentage of social time spent with family members (based on P6ABC). All these measures define homophily on the basis of intensity of contact with kin, and the key source of variation lies with contacts with extended kin.<sup>8</sup>

### 3.2.2 Social Trust and Willingness to Cooperate

- **Generalized social trust.** This variable is based on the standard, single survey question (**Trust**): should most people be trusted, or one cannot be too careful (with other people)? The answers are measured on a scale from 1 to 5.

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Growiec (2015).

<sup>8</sup>The measure based on social time spent with family members appears very noisy and thus of limited usefulness for subsequent analyses. Other three measures are highly correlated; our final choice is motivated by the assumption that maintaining bonding social capital requires frequent contacts and it should be easiest for the respondents to recall the contacts from a relatively short time period such as the last week.

- **Social trust within one's network.** We also capture the degree of social trust one holds against people whom he/she knows, i.e., the acquaintances. Excluding social ties with kin,<sup>9</sup> we measure whether the respondent thinks his/her acquaintances always behave honestly with him/her, whether he/she can always count on their help, and whether he/she trusts them completely (**Trust\_Net** based on P8BC\_479). The standardized Cronbach's alpha coefficient of this scale amounts to 0.8492 and its reliability cannot be improved by removing items.
- **Generalized willingness to cooperate.** Our measure of generalized willingness to cooperate is based on four items capturing whether the respondent (i) declares to always behave honestly with others, (ii) is convinced that others are honest with him/her as well as (iii) with themselves, and (iv) agrees that all rules should be obeyed (**Cooperation** based on P40\_1237). The standardized Cronbach's alpha coefficient of this scale is not as high as the previous ones but remains acceptable – it amounts to 0.5982. Moreover, its reliability cannot be improved by removing any of the items or by adding further of the available items related to allowing for cheating in certain situations.
- **Willingness to cooperate within one's network.** Our measure of willingness to cooperate with one's own acquaintances is based on six items. Excluding social ties with kin, we measure whether the respondent always behaves honestly with his/her acquaintances and whether they can always count on the respondent's help, also when this would require substantial sacrifice (**Coop\_Net** based on P8BC\_356). The standardized Cronbach's alpha coefficient of this scale is 0.8210 and its reliability cannot be improved by removing items.

### 3.2.3 Incomes and Subjective Well-Being

- **Scale of perceived incomes.** Individual incomes are notoriously difficult to measure in survey data because often the respondents don't know their exact pay, deliberately modify it, or refuse to answer. One cause for concern is that

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<sup>9</sup>We exclude social ties within family when computing our measures of social trust and willingness to cooperate because these ties are subject to different social norms, a higher degree of social control and are formed and dissolved based on different criteria. In our data, respondents are on average much more trustful and willing to cooperate with acquaintances from family than with acquaintances from work or other acquaintances.



missing observations tend to be disproportionately concentrated in the upper tail of the distribution. Another problem is that what matters more for individuals' subjective well-being than the raw amount of money earned, is whether the earnings are sufficient to satisfy their needs and how they compare against a certain point of reference. For these reasons, we have constructed a scale of subjectively perceived, relative earnings. It consists of five items (**Income\_Rel** based on P31–P35), measuring whether the respondent considers his/her material situation (or, separately, incomes) as satisfactory and whether his/her material situation (or, separately, incomes) is better or worse when compared to the average material situation/incomes of the respondent's peers in Poland. It also includes the respondent's self-assessed income decile. The standardized Cronbach's alpha coefficient of this standardized scale is 0.8860 and its reliability cannot be improved by removing items.

- **Log earnings.** Keeping all the above caveats in mind, we have also used actual reported earnings in some of our regressions. In accordance with the Mincerian specification of the earnings equation, we have applied the log transformation on the data. Individuals who reported zero earnings have been omitted from the regressions (treated as missing data). Overall, there are 35.3% missing observations for this variable.
- **Subjective well-being.** We are also interested in individuals' subjective well-being. We distinguish between self-reported life satisfaction (**Life\_Satisf**) and happiness (**Happiness**), each measured on a scale from 0 to 10. The difference between both outcomes is that, as argued by [Gamble and Gärling \(2012\)](#), life satisfaction captures a more long-term component of individuals' well-being than happiness.

### 3.2.4 Control Variables

- **Sociability.** It may be argued that some individuals may maintain more social ties than others as well as spend more time socializing, and at the same time, e.g., be more satisfied with their lives, just because of their innate psychological traits. If an innate trait of this type (which can be called "sociability")

were a cause both for more social capital and more life satisfaction, then the inference on the relationship between the latter two variables would be biased. Therefore it is required to control for such traits in our regressions. As two alternative measures of these traits, we construct a scale of sociability (**Sociability**, based two items, P14\_1–2), and a scale of general positive affect towards others (**Pos\_Affect**, based on all 30 items in P8ABC). The former of the two variables includes the assertions of respondents whether they are sociable (like spending time with others) and open, interested in the world. The standardized Cronbach's alpha coefficient of this scale is 0.7006. The latter variable, on the other hand, sums the replies on whether the respondent is emotionally related with his/her acquaintances, knows them for a long time, behaves honestly towards them, thinks others behave honestly as well, offers his/her help, believes that he/she can count on help from others, can forgive a lot, has full trust, and believes others trust in him/her in return as well. The standardized Cronbach's alpha coefficient of this scale is 0.9407 and its reliability cannot be improved by removing items.

- **Choice and control.** As an important control variable, we also include the question whether the respondent feels that he/she has choice and control over his/her life (**Choice\_Ctrl**). The answers are measured on a scale from 1 to 5.
- **Other control variables:** age, age squared, gender (female=1), size of town of residence, employment and occupation status (especially: student, retired, unemployed, housewife, farmer), civil status (especially: widowed), education, work experience, handicapped status, chronic illness.

## 4 Links Among the Four Social Capital Dimensions

The first step of the empirical study is to investigate the correlations among the main social capital variables. Table 1 provides the first piece of evidence supporting the view that the inner structure of the social capital concept, i.e. the 'map' of social capital dimensions, in fact follows Figure 1 presented in the introduction.

We find that network degree correlates strongly and positively with network centrality (which was expected given the definition of both variables); it also correlates positively (though not as strongly) with bridging social capital. These two correlations are in fact the only ones that are sufficiently robust to be present also when controlling for the simultaneous effects of the other two social capital dimensions.

Looking at simple correlations, we also observe that network degree correlates negatively with bonding social capital. Furthermore, network centrality also correlates positively with bridging, and negatively with bonding social capital. Bridging and bonding social capital are, in turn, essentially uncorrelated in our data – in line with the theory which views them as functionally opposite dimensions of social capital. All these results are in perfect accordance with the associated literature (e.g.,

Table 1: Overview of correlations

	Degree	Centrality	Bridging	Bonding
Simple correlation				
Degree	1			
Centrality	0,8387***	1		
Bridging	0,21***	0,21***	1	
Bonding	-0,1072***	-0,1036***	-0,0443	1
Simple correlation with controls				
Degree	1			
Centrality	0,8332***	1		
Bridging	0,179***	0,1719***	1	
Bonding	-0,0896***	-0,0914***	-0,0343	1
Partial correlation				
Degree	1			
Centrality	0,7641***	1		
Bridging	0,1178***	0,0596	1	
Bonding	-0,0402	-0,0311	-0,0156	1
Partial correlation with controls				
Degree	1			
Centrality	0,7594***	1		
Bridging	0,115***	0,0397	1	
Bonding	0,0049	-0,0448	0,0065	1

Controls: sociability (2 variables), gender, age, age squared, choice and control, widowed, size of town of residence, education, cooperation, trust, trust inside the network.

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Putnam, 2000).

Reassuringly, netting out the impacts of key control variables of our study (listed below the table) does not affect the results qualitatively.

## 5 Relationships with Outcome Variables

The second step of our study, aimed at mapping the dimensions of social capital, is to identify their diverse relationships with a range of outcome variables: social trust, willingness to cooperate, individual incomes, life satisfaction and happiness. This is done in a series of regressions, estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). Hence, our theoretical assumption implicit in the analysis is that the outcome variables do not influence individuals' social capital stocks. Being aware of the problem of potential reverse causality, however, which we cannot exclude given the limitations of our cross-sectional survey dataset, we are careful to interpret our results as partial correlations rather than causal inferences.

The first round of regressions, with social trust and willingness to cooperate as the explained variables, provides the empirical justification for the rightmost three edges of the graph in Figure 1.

The regressions explaining individual incomes and subjective well-being, in turn, include as regressors both the four key social capital dimensions, and social trust and willingness to cooperate. Hence, the estimated coefficients on social capital variables capture only the direct links between social capital and the outcome variables and exclude the indirect effects working via social trust and cooperation.

Table 2: Direct effects: summary of regression results.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Trust	Trust_Net	Cooperation	Coop_Net	Income_Rel	lnIncome	Life_Satisf	Happiness
InDegree	0.202* [1.682]	-0.139* [-1.682]	-0.0414 [-0.680]	-0.205*** [-2.599]	0.0259 [0.309]	0.0174 [0.285]	0.466** [2.542]	0.261 [1.389]
InCentrality	-0.0298 [-0.724]	0.0150 [0.595]	0.0174 [0.843]	0.0852*** [3.332]	-0.00410 [-0.163]	0.00596 [0.299]	-0.0123 [-0.185]	0.0239 [0.359]
Bridging	-0.182*** [-3.383]	-0.0308 [-0.961]	0.0583** [2.281]	0.0701** [2.176]	0.0814** [2.342]	-0.0162 [-0.638]	-0.0725 [-0.904]	0.0174 [0.233]
Bonding	-0.182 [-1.476]	-0.163** [-2.189]	0.000772 [0.0122]	-0.0842 [-1.175]	-0.149* [-1.832]	-0.0186 [-0.264]	0.321 [1.568]	0.0615 [0.311]
Trust			0.121*** [7.296]	-0.00561 [-0.312]	0.111*** [4.621]	0.0531*** [3.053]	-0.0159 [-0.311]	0.00179 [0.0345]
Trust_Net			0.0578 [1.174]		0.178** [2.446]	0.00568 [0.121]	-0.201 [-1.323]	-0.261 [-1.536]
Cooperation	0.538*** [7.583]	0.315*** [6.971]			0.148*** [3.168]	-0.0227 [-0.664]	0.259** [2.338]	0.270** [2.461]
Coop_Net	0.0168 [0.146]				-0.0846 [-1.080]	-0.0947* [-1.836]	0.362** [2.037]	0.280 [1.591]
Income_Rel2							0.709*** [8.453]	0.476*** [5.968]
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	882	877	882	882	881	570	876	876
R-squared	0.113	0.215	0.212	0.076	0.367	0.440	0.370	0.342
Adjusted R-squared	0.0991	0.202	0.199	0.0624	0.347	0.412	0.350	0.322

Notes: robust  $t$ -statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Additional control variables included in the regressions have been omitted from the table for readability. Parameter estimates on control variables can be found the appendix, alongside a large number of robustness checks.

## 5.1 Direct Effects

Our principal findings on the direct effects of social capital are summarized in Table 2 and discussed below. It should be noted that this table includes only the results from the most sophisticated variants of our regression models and thus contains estimates which are typically very conservative. Some of our qualitative claims which do not appear statistically significant in Table 2 have been substantiated on the basis of numerous robustness checks, though.<sup>10</sup>

**Social trust (see Tables 3–4).** We find that social trust is inversely related to bonding social capital (the share of family members among all social ties maintained by a given individual) and, unexpectedly, bridging social capital (diversity of one’s acquaintances). It is also increased by the agent’s *average* (but not total) network centrality (**Bridge\_Net**). The respondent’s bonding social capital and average centrality are also crucial in determining the level of social trust within one’s social network. We also find that social trust is strongly positively correlated with the individuals’ willingness to cooperate.

**Willingness to cooperate (see Tables 5–6).** We find that willingness to cooperate is positively related to bridging social capital. The respondents’ network degree (number of social ties), network centrality, and bonding social capital appear statistically insignificant. Bridging social capital is also positively related to willingness to cooperate within one’s social network. Interestingly, network centrality appears very important for cooperation in one’s network but not generally. It is confirmed that social trust is strongly positively correlated with the individuals’ willingness to cooperate. However, cooperation within one’s network does not correlate with social trust anymore.

**Individual incomes (Tables 7–8).** Controlling for a range of usual determinants of individuals’ incomes, we find that incomes (measured along a relative scale, **Income\_Rel**) are robustly positively related to social trust (both in its generalized form and within one’s network) and generalized willingness to cooperate. There are also direct positive effects of bridging social capital, negative effects of bonding social capital, and positive effects of average, but not total, network centrality (**Bridge\_Net**).

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<sup>10</sup>For details of these robustness checks, please consult the appendix.

The results for log earnings, excluding the individuals who reported zero earnings or refused to answer, are much less conclusive. We only find positive and significant effects of average centrality and generalized social trust.

**Life satisfaction and happiness (see Tables 9–10).** We find that both subjective well-being measures are robustly positively related to individuals' willingness to cooperate and incomes. Bridging and bonding social capital measures appear generally rather unimportant in the regressions because they are swamped by the general positive well-being effects of the raw number of acquaintances (network degree), as well as individuals' sociability.

**Effects of control variables.** All regressions considered in Table 2 as well as Tables 3–10 in the appendix include a number of standard socio-demographic control variables. The effects of these variables are generally of expected sign, even if sometimes statistically insignificant. We find that:

- The feeling of choice and control over one's life (**Choice\_Ctrl**) is a very important covariate which goes together with higher social trust, willingness to cooperate, earnings, life satisfaction, and happiness.
- **Sociability** is positively related to social trust within one's network as well as life satisfaction and happiness.
- Positive affect towards others (**Pos\_Affect**) goes together with willingness to cooperate as well as life satisfaction and happiness.
- Some variables exhibit nonlinear age profiles. In particular, a robust U-shaped profile is observed for willingness to cooperate and happiness, whereas earnings exhibit an inverted U-shaped profile.
- Education is positively related to earnings and happiness.
- Students and managers exhibit above-average willingness to cooperate within their social networks. Firm owners report above-average incomes whereas students and the unemployed report below-average incomes.
- Widows and widowers report, on average, lower willingness to cooperate as well as lower life satisfaction and happiness.

- Women are, on average, more willing to cooperate than men. There also exists a substantial gender wage gap: women tend to earn less on average (even when controlling for all the other variables of the study).
- Disability lowers incomes, whereas acute illness lowers both incomes and happiness.

## 5.2 Community–Level Effects

We have also checked if, on top of the direct effects described above, there also exist community-level effects of the four key social capital dimensions. The hypothesis is that observing the social capital patterns prevalent in one’s community may affect the individual’s willingness to trust others and engage in cooperation with them, thereby giving rise to positive or negative feedback loops (virtuous and vicious circles). One such mechanism could be related to bridging social capital and social trust, as identified by [Growiec and Growiec \(2014a, 2016\)](#): individuals may be more trustful if there is more bridging social capital at the level of their community.

To this end, we have computed average levels of these variables in individuals’ respective reference groups. We have stratified individuals by:

- **InDegree**: size of town of residence, and dummies for: having a high-skilled job, being retired or unemployed, being in a relationship;
- **InCentrality** and **Bridge\_Net**: size of town of residence, and dummies for: having a high-skilled job, being retired or unemployed, being in a relationship;
- **Bridging**: dummies for: having a high-skilled job, being retired or unemployed, being in a relationship;
- **Bonding**: size of town of residence, and dummies for: gender, having a high-skilled job, being retired or unemployed.

The choice of the aforementioned dimensions follows from an auxiliary regression analysis where we have identified the key socio-demographic correlates of individuals’ social capital stocks (Table 11 in the appendix). The limited number of selected categories allows us to obtain a grid of cells of sufficient size which, in turn, helps us



reach a compromise between avoiding too small cells and the appropriate differentiation across reference groups.

Having computed these subgroup means, we have included them in our regression models, discussed above and documented in Tables 3–10. The results for the augmented regressions, documented in detail in Tables 12–19 in the appendix, confirm the previous ones as well as provide a few additional insights. While on average, community–level effects are typically of minor importance for individual outcomes when compared to the direct effects of individuals’ own social capital stocks, there are nevertheless a few noteworthy extra results which we discuss below.

- Higher mean log centrality (i.e., being part of a relatively central group) goes together with higher social trust.
- Higher mean bridging social capital goes together with higher social trust within one’s network.<sup>11</sup>
- Higher mean bonding social capital goes together with increased willingness to cooperate.
- Higher mean log degree (i.e., being part of a relatively well-connected group) goes together with *lower* willingness to cooperate within one’s network.
- Higher mean bridging social capital is associated with slightly higher perceived incomes but *lower* absolute incomes (in the subsample that reports them).
- Higher mean bridging and bonding social capital is associated with slightly higher levels of happiness.

### 5.3 Micro–Macro Interactions

Finally, we have also augmented our regressions with interaction terms between (demeaned) individual social capital levels and their respective (demeaned) reference-group averages. The hypothesis is that observing the social networks prevalent in one’s community may reinforce the individual’s social capital formation mechanisms,

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<sup>11</sup>The same sign of effect is observed for generalized social trust as well but the results are not statistically significant. Thus our survey data only partially confirm the hypothesis of a positive feedback loop between bridging social capital and social trust.

thereby giving rise to positive or negative feedback loops (virtuous and vicious circles) already among the four considered social capital dimensions.


Our results are mixed here. On the positive side, as presented in Tables 20–27 in the appendix, they help corroborate our earlier findings and thus further justify their robustness. On the negative side, however, we identify very few feedback loops among the four social capital dimensions as most interaction terms are statistically insignificant. Nevertheless we find:

- A positive interaction effect is observed for log degree in explaining willingness to cooperate within one’s network. Higher network degree (more social contacts) is particularly useful among individuals belonging to groups where others also have many social contacts.
- A positive interaction effect is observed for average centrality in explaining absolute reported incomes. Being a network bridge is particularly rewarding among individuals belonging to groups where others also act as bridges.
- A positive interaction effect is observed for bonding social capital in explaining happiness. Family ties are particularly good for your happiness if you are in an environment where others also have many family ties.

## 5.4 Nonlinear Regression Results


The final step of our study consisted in investigating the possibility of nonlinear relationships between the four key social capital variables, on the one hand, and incomes or subjective well-being, on the other hand. To this end, we have applied a Generalized Additive Model (GAM). We have restricted ourselves to the case where the impact of control variables is linear, and estimated the nonlinear impact of the key social capital variables nonparametrically.

Figure 2: Nonparametric estimates of the relationship between various social capital dimensions and incomes



Note: the figure presents the smooth components of a fitted Generalized Additive Model which also includes linear effects of trust, trust within the network, willingness to cooperate, cognitive work dummy, education, gender, freedom of choice and control, the firm owner dummy, and the unemployed dummy.

Figure 3: Nonparametric estimates of the relationship between various social capital dimensions and life satisfaction



Note: the figure presents the smooth components of a fitted Generalized Additive Model which also includes linear effects of willingness to cooperate, positive affect towards others, sociability, freedom of choice and control, and the widowed dummy.

We find that some of the key relations are indeed nonlinear. In particular, for individual incomes – where in linear regressions we found no impact of network degree and centrality, a positive effect of bridging and a negative effect of bonding social capital – now we indicate that these relationships are in fact somewhat more nuanced (see Figure 2). For individuals with a low or moderate level of acquaintances, having more of them is mildly favorable in terms of incomes; however, the opposite is true for individuals who already have a large network of acquaintances. We obtain a similar result for bridging social capital: the relationship between bridging social capital and individual earnings is inverted U-shaped. Both results agree with (as well as strengthen and extend) our earlier findings (Growiec and Growiec, 2014a, 2016). They can be interpreted in terms of a time cost of maintaining social ties, especially weaker ties with dissimilar others, coupled with diminishing returns to social capital stocks (e.g., in the form of facilitated flow of information).

For life satisfaction – where in linear regressions we found a positive impact of network degree and no additional impact of network centrality, bridging or bonding social capital – deviations from linearity are less pronounced (Figure 3). Substantial uncertainty is involved, however, in capturing the shape of impact of network degree on life satisfaction among (relatively few) individuals with very numerous acquaintances.

## 6 Conclusion

This paper provides new data allowing to map the *inner structure* of social capital. We identify the mutual relationships among four key social capital dimensions: (i) network degree, (ii) network centrality, (iii) bridging and (iv) bonding social capital, and characterize their links with social trust and willingness to cooperate, which we view as key *immediate outcomes* of social capital. We also use multivariate regressions to capture the joint relationship between all six aforementioned variables and the *ultimate outcomes*: individual incomes as well as life satisfaction and happiness.

We find that the four considered social capital dimensions can be reliably operationalized in our data, and that their empirical measures are distinct but interrelated, and also related to social trust and willingness to cooperate. We also identify

that both social trust and individual willingness to cooperate are strongly positively linked to individual incomes. On top of that, bridging social capital relates positively to incomes, whereas bonding social capital relates negatively; network degree and centrality are statistically insignificant. Next, we find that the social component of individuals' life satisfaction (or, similarly but not equivalently, self-reported happiness) is determined primarily by the number of social ties an individual holds (network degree), whereas other social capital dimensions appear to be insignificant. Finally, community-level effects are typically of minor importance for individual outcomes when compared to the direct effects of individuals' own social capital stocks.

The current study can be extended in various ways. First of all, it would be highly rewarding if the proposed survey questions could be included in a larger cross-country or panel survey program. The absence of sufficiently detailed information on social capital variables in large survey datasets such as the WVS and ESS is a serious drag on the research on the effects and determinants of social capital. Gathering panel data on variables similar to the ones defined here would clearly allow the researchers to depart from studying cross-sectional correlations towards the identification of relationships that have a decidedly more causal character.

Secondly, the dataset provided with the current study can also be exploited to provide evidence on the patterns of social formation. This remains high on our research agenda.

Thirdly, the empirical results of the current study could be compared with their theoretical counterparts. For example, [Kamiński, Growiec, and Growiec \(2017\)](#) study a multi-agent simulation model which delivers within-country results that are in broad agreement with the ones from this study, and provides useful extrapolations helpful in studying cross-country differences.

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## A Appendix: Auxiliary Social Capital Variables

- **Subjective local network density.** This is a qualitative measure based on respondents' feelings whether their egocentric network is closer to one or the other network graph shown to them during the interview (P9). High values indicate that the network is locally sparse and the respondent acts as a bridge between separate subgroups, whereas low values pertain to individuals whose network is locally dense (acquaintances know each other as well).
- **Intensity of social interaction.** This is captured by the total number of hours spent on social contacts with acquaintances from family, work, and other acquaintances (P6ABC). The variable is denoted as **Network\_time**.
- **Ability to draw from network resources.** We would like to differentiate between, on the one hand, having access to diverse network resources and being able to bridge a disconnected network, and on the other hand, being able to draw from these network resources for one's own benefit. This latter measure we consider not to be a stock variable such as bridging or bonding social capital, but a flow outcome variable. Our measure of ability to draw from network resources is based on two items: whether one manages to save money or time thanks to information obtained from one's acquaintances (**Network\_res** based on P21–P22). Its standardized Cronbach's alpha coefficient amounts to 0.7901.
- **Ability to draw from bridging network resources.** Network resources are not just about saving money and time due to enhanced information flow. We have also constructed a measure of ability to draw benefits from one's bridging network resources. It is based on nine items: whether the respondent has asked his/her acquaintances from work – or, separately, other acquaintances – for financial support, a major favor, help with a non-standard work problem or proposed business cooperation, as well as discussed about arranging contact with a specialist or talked on important personal issues (**Bridg\_res** based on P7BC\_12345). For obvious reasons, we exclude the item about asking colleagues from work for help with work-related problems. The standardized Cronbach's alpha coefficient of this scale amounts to 0.7517.

- **Ability to draw from bonding network resources.** Our measure of ability to draw benefits from one's bonding network resources is based on four items: whether the respondent has asked his/her acquaintances from family for financial support, a major favor, help with a non-standard work problem or proposed business cooperation as well as discussed about arranging contact with a specialist (**Bond\_res** based on P7A\_2345). The standardized Cronbach's alpha coefficient of this scale amounts to 0.8991 and reliability of the scale cannot be improved by removing items.

## B Appendix: Additional Tables

Table 3: Explaining generalized trust.

VARIABLES	(1) Trust	(2) Trust	(3) Trust	(4) Trust	(5) Trust	(6) Trust	(7) Trust
lnDegree	0.0307 [0.405]				-0.0439 [-0.564]	0.00312 [0.0367]	0.164 [1.323]
lnCentrality		-0.0168 [-0.701]					-0.0463 [-1.191]
Bridging			-0.137*** [-2.781]			-0.187*** [-3.321]	-0.131** [-2.328]
Bonding				-0.630*** [-3.397]		-0.481*** [-2.602]	-0.612*** [-3.262]
Bridge_Net					0.294*** [4.929]	0.279*** [4.041]	
Cooperation	0.507*** [7.538]	0.511*** [7.555]	0.523*** [7.809]	0.479*** [6.769]	0.462*** [6.934]	0.463*** [6.653]	0.499*** [6.988]
Coop_Net	0.0171 [0.156]	0.0199 [0.182]	0.0473 [0.436]	-0.0629 [-0.518]	-0.0185 [-0.171]	-0.0308 [-0.259]	-0.0297 [-0.245]
Pos_Affect	-0.219* [-1.698]	-0.214* [-1.659]	-0.238* [-1.861]	-0.0706 [-0.478]	-0.213* [-1.679]	-0.131 [-0.899]	-0.0779 [-0.526]
Female	-0.0540 [-0.796]	-0.0533 [-0.785]	-0.0597 [-0.881]	-0.0487 [-0.680]	-0.0359 [-0.537]	-0.0334 [-0.471]	-0.0506 [-0.707]
Age	0.00646 [0.449]	0.00733 [0.509]	0.00954 [0.661]	0.00850 [0.559]	0.00134 [0.0952]	0.00737 [0.491]	0.0111 [0.727]
Age2	-9.84e-05 [-0.643]	-0.000112 [-0.732]	-0.000133 [-0.863]	-0.000112 [-0.697]	-1.77e-05 [-0.118]	-7.64e-05 [-0.478]	-0.000143 [-0.879]
Choice_Ctrl	0.162*** [4.160]	0.167*** [4.277]	0.170*** [4.424]	0.166*** [4.126]	0.147*** [3.817]	0.159*** [3.947]	0.173*** [4.258]
Town_Size	-0.0180 [-1.408]	-0.0195 [-1.529]	-0.0189 [-1.496]	-0.0243* [-1.768]	-0.0222* [-1.753]	-0.0270* [-1.950]	-0.0247* [-1.781]
_Istatus_1	0.247 [1.525]	0.260 [1.604]	0.273* [1.713]	0.236 [1.328]	0.223 [1.377]	0.213 [1.201]	0.244 [1.370]
_Istatus_8	0.233 [1.363]	0.235 [1.383]	0.249 [1.480]	0.181 [0.990]	0.305* [1.847]	0.269 [1.521]	0.168 [0.923]
Constant	1.069** [2.540]	1.060** [2.529]	1.321*** [3.086]	1.028** [2.271]	0.503 [1.182]	0.847* [1.800]	1.363*** [2.898]
Observations	942	942	942	843	942	843	843
R-squared	0.102	0.102	0.109	0.112	0.130	0.141	0.120
Adjusted R-squared	0.0911	0.0914	0.0987	0.100	0.118	0.126	0.105

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 4: Explaining trust within one's network.

VARIABLES	(1) Trust_Net	(2) Trust_Net	(3) Trust_Net	(4) Trust_Net	(5) Trust_Net	(6) Trust_Net	(7) Trust_Net
InDegree	-0.0896* [-1.862]				-0.102** [-2.095]	-0.113** [-2.139]	-0.139* [-1.682]
InCentrality		-0.00138 [-0.0940]					0.0150 [0.595]
Bridging			-0.0283 [-0.906]			-0.0375 [-1.168]	-0.0308 [-0.961]
Bonding				-0.143** [-1.970]		-0.141* [-1.876]	-0.163** [-2.189]
Bridge_Net					0.0670* [1.871]	0.0585 [1.575]	
Cooperation	0.320*** [7.218]	0.319*** [7.185]	0.321*** [7.189]	0.313*** [6.984]	0.311*** [6.975]	0.309*** [6.817]	0.315*** [6.971]
Sociability	0.251*** [8.667]	0.243*** [8.389]	0.248*** [8.598]	0.239*** [8.154]	0.234*** [7.716]	0.241*** [7.861]	0.252*** [8.477]
Female	-0.00636 [-0.160]	-0.00706 [-0.177]	-0.00842 [-0.211]	-0.0185 [-0.455]	-0.00240 [-0.0602]	-0.0159 [-0.390]	-0.0185 [-0.455]
Age	0.00955 [1.129]	0.00885 [1.045]	0.00935 [1.098]	0.00658 [0.757]	0.00842 [0.995]	0.00694 [0.802]	0.00789 [0.909]
Age2	-8.52e-05 [-0.945]	-7.56e-05 [-0.838]	-8.04e-05 [-0.886]	-4.28e-05 [-0.458]	-6.88e-05 [-0.761]	-4.43e-05 [-0.476]	-5.68e-05 [-0.610]
Choice_Ctrl	0.0954*** [4.051]	0.0924*** [3.895]	0.0928*** [3.944]	0.0876*** [3.576]	0.0932*** [3.931]	0.0889*** [3.631]	0.0903*** [3.716]
Widowed	0.0200 [0.237]	0.0291 [0.343]	0.0268 [0.318]	0.0437 [0.499]	0.0283 [0.340]	0.0354 [0.414]	0.0313 [0.361]
Town_Size	0.00679 [0.952]	0.00868 [1.219]	0.00866 [1.223]	0.00560 [0.758]	0.00610 [0.853]	0.00275 [0.367]	0.00289 [0.387]
_Istatus_1	-0.00277 [-0.0333]	-0.0174 [-0.211]	-0.0138 [-0.167]	-0.0283 [-0.335]	-0.00766 [-0.0928]	-0.00806 [-0.0938]	-0.00758 [-0.0879]
_Istatus_8	0.0822 [0.815]	0.0714 [0.704]	0.0737 [0.728]	0.0634 [0.611]	0.0999 [0.989]	0.0918 [0.885]	0.0835 [0.798]
Constant	0.949*** [3.558]	1.015*** [3.791]	1.061*** [3.899]	1.178*** [4.307]	0.853*** [3.166]	1.096*** [3.884]	1.134*** [3.908]
Observations	937	937	937	877	937	877	877
R-squared	0.223	0.219	0.220	0.208	0.226	0.217	0.215
Adjusted R-squared	0.213	0.210	0.211	0.198	0.216	0.204	0.202

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 5: Explaining generalized willingness to cooperate.

VARIABLES	(1) Cooperation	(2) Cooperation	(3) Cooperation	(4) Cooperation	(5) Cooperation	(6) Cooperation	(7) Cooperation
InDegree	0.0335 [0.925]				0.0171 [0.474]	-0.00937 [-0.246]	-0.0414 [-0.680]
InCentrality		0.0189 [1.589]					0.0174 [0.843]
Bridging			0.0709*** [2.888]			0.0511** [1.969]	0.0583** [2.281]
Bonding				-0.0151 [-0.240]		0.0149 [0.236]	0.000772 [0.0122]
Bridge_Net					0.0628** [2.212]	0.0438 [1.501]	
Trust	0.117*** [7.210]	0.118*** [7.244]	0.121*** [7.465]	0.117*** [7.094]	0.111*** [6.721]	0.116*** [6.922]	0.121*** [7.296]
Trust_Net	0.0494 [1.028]	0.0521 [1.088]	0.0456 [0.946]	0.0556 [1.140]	0.0372 [0.770]	0.0501 [1.014]	0.0578 [1.174]
Pos_Affect	0.279*** [4.578]	0.269*** [4.430]	0.277*** [4.568]	0.256*** [4.205]	0.282*** [4.646]	0.252*** [4.116]	0.246*** [4.007]
Female	0.0712** [2.149]	0.0703** [2.121]	0.0732** [2.223]	0.0806** [2.378]	0.0732** [2.210]	0.0824** [2.424]	0.0811** [2.386]
Age	-0.00755 [-1.115]	-0.00773 [-1.143]	-0.00852 [-1.265]	-0.0112 [-1.614]	-0.00826 [-1.219]	-0.0126* [-1.813]	-0.0121* [-1.746]
Age2	0.000129* [1.745]	0.000132* [1.799]	0.000137* [1.877]	0.000164** [2.170]	0.000140* [1.897]	0.000180** [2.373]	0.000174** [2.296]
Choice_Ctrl	0.0453** [2.168]	0.0438** [2.104]	0.0430** [2.088]	0.0491** [2.287]	0.0432** [2.072]	0.0450** [2.101]	0.0458** [2.140]
Widowed	-0.159** [-2.338]	-0.151** [-2.244]	-0.151** [-2.270]	-0.171** [-2.421]	-0.148** [-2.193]	-0.152** [-2.207]	-0.155** [-2.251]
Town_Size	0.00240 [0.400]	0.00262 [0.439]	0.00182 [0.308]	-0.00100 [-0.163]	0.00126 [0.211]	-0.00100 [-0.161]	-0.000690 [-0.110]
_Istatus_8	0.0900 [1.137]	0.0973 [1.227]	0.0866 [1.097]	0.0692 [0.861]	0.107 [1.351]	0.0767 [0.952]	0.0728 [0.893]
Constant	1.765*** [8.453]	1.730*** [8.336]	1.579*** [7.311]	1.903*** [9.146]	1.627*** [7.594]	1.669*** [7.326]	1.699*** [7.253]
Observations	942	942	942	882	942	882	882
R-squared	0.219	0.220	0.226	0.205	0.223	0.213	0.212
Adjusted R-squared	0.210	0.211	0.217	0.195	0.213	0.200	0.199

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .



Table 6: Explaining willingness to cooperate within one's network.

VARIABLES	(1) Coop_Net	(2) Coop_Net	(3) Coop_Net	(4) Coop_Net	(5) Coop_Net	(6) Coop_Net	(7) Coop_Net
InDegree	0.0549 [1.291]				0.0214 [0.500]	-0.0272 [-0.572]	-0.205*** [-2.599]
InCentrality		0.0590*** [4.023]					0.0852*** [3.332]
Bridging			0.0931*** [3.019]			0.0553* [1.701]	0.0701** [2.176]
Bonding				-0.102 [-1.446]		-0.0478 [-0.651]	-0.0842 [-1.175]
Bridge_Net					0.131*** [3.823]	0.102*** [2.805]	
Trust	-0.00787 [-0.431]	-0.00629 [-0.348]	-0.00310 [-0.173]	-0.0117 [-0.631]	-0.0230 [-1.254]	-0.0183 [-1.001]	-0.00561 [-0.312]
Female	0.0637 [1.633]	0.0588 [1.521]	0.0666* [1.717]	0.0535 [1.359]	0.0677* [1.747]	0.0567 [1.448]	0.0523 [1.335]
Age	-0.00378 [-0.431]	-0.00445 [-0.509]	-0.00493 [-0.563]	-0.00608 [-0.679]	-0.00528 [-0.603]	-0.00808 [-0.901]	-0.00669 [-0.749]
Age2	8.21e-05 [0.862]	9.46e-05 [0.997]	9.14e-05 [0.962]	0.000112 [1.150]	0.000106 [1.108]	0.000136 [1.395]	0.000121 [1.240]
Choice_Ctrl	0.122*** [5.047]	0.112*** [4.729]	0.119*** [5.023]	0.113*** [4.708]	0.115*** [4.801]	0.105*** [4.362]	0.105*** [4.466]
Widowed	-0.130 [-1.440]	-0.0968 [-1.101]	-0.121 [-1.347]	-0.116 [-1.249]	-0.105 [-1.161]	-0.0820 [-0.896]	-0.0726 [-0.813]
Town_Size	0.0186*** [2.617]	0.0199*** [2.843]	0.0175** [2.537]	0.0110 [1.542]	0.0160** [2.283]	0.0103 [1.420]	0.0105 [1.470]
_Istatus_1	0.143** [2.172]	0.121* [1.820]	0.133** [2.048]	0.145** [2.163]	0.131** [2.019]	0.127* [1.908]	0.117* [1.750]
_Istatus_8	0.173* [1.807]	0.184* [1.915]	0.169* [1.784]	0.168* [1.713]	0.206** [2.141]	0.188* [1.921]	0.198** [2.017]
Constant	3.251*** [14.35]	3.089*** [13.46]	2.982*** [12.47]	3.416*** [14.91]	2.914*** [12.29]	2.980*** [11.65]	2.904*** [11.02]
Observations	942	942	942	882	942	882	882
R-squared	0.066	0.083	0.076	0.055	0.084	0.073	0.076
Adjusted R-squared	0.0560	0.0731	0.0660	0.0440	0.0727	0.0587	0.0624

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 7: Explaining earnings (subjective scale).

VARIABLES	(1) Income_Rel	(2) Income_Rel	(3) Income_Rel	(4) Income_Rel	(5) Income_Rel	(6) Income_Rel	(7) Income_Rel
InDegree	0.0546 [1.040]				0.0230 [0.442]	0.000578 [0.0105]	0.0259 [0.309]
InCentrality		0.00738 [0.491]					-0.00410 [-0.163]
Bridging			0.103*** [3.104]			0.0628* [1.774]	0.0814** [2.342]
Bonding				-0.166** [-2.059]		-0.116 [-1.397]	-0.149* [-1.832]
Bridge_Net					0.133*** [3.310]	0.102** [2.371]	
Trust	0.117*** [5.010]	0.118*** [5.037]	0.124*** [5.324]	0.106*** [4.383]	0.106*** [4.461]	0.102*** [4.151]	0.111*** [4.621]
Trust_Net	0.184*** [2.638]	0.182*** [2.612]	0.181*** [2.630]	0.175** [2.417]	0.161** [2.320]	0.165** [2.277]	0.178** [2.446]
Cooperation	0.154*** [3.519]	0.154*** [3.520]	0.140*** [3.163]	0.159*** [3.426]	0.140*** [3.213]	0.141*** [3.019]	0.148*** [3.168]
Coop_Net	-0.0157 [-0.208]	-0.0150 [-0.199]	-0.0359 [-0.474]	-0.0680 [-0.878]	-0.0243 [-0.323]	-0.0834 [-1.069]	-0.0846 [-1.080]
Pos_Affect	-0.247** [-2.225]	-0.247** [-2.219]	-0.229** [-2.063]	-0.201* [-1.741]	-0.233** [-2.100]	-0.192* [-1.663]	-0.191 [-1.640]
_IP27_2	0.204*** [2.867]	0.201*** [2.841]	0.197*** [2.782]	0.228*** [3.081]	0.209*** [2.964]	0.230*** [3.082]	0.223*** [2.963]
_IP27_3	-0.0163 [-0.171]	-0.0164 [-0.171]	-0.0178 [-0.183]	0.0379 [0.384]	-0.000470 [-0.00484]	0.0416 [0.417]	0.0335 [0.336]
Education	0.0931*** [2.822]	0.0916*** [2.780]	0.0936*** [2.849]	0.101*** [2.950]	0.0912*** [2.775]	0.101*** [2.965]	0.103*** [3.002]
P25	0.434*** [2.870]	0.432*** [2.857]	0.450*** [2.987]	0.453*** [2.839]	0.451*** [2.937]	0.484*** [2.981]	0.469*** [2.931]
P26	0.126 [1.198]	0.125 [1.197]	0.120 [1.142]	0.162 [1.374]	0.111 [1.045]	0.140 [1.167]	0.156 [1.317]
Female	-0.217*** [-4.690]	-0.217*** [-4.674]	-0.213*** [-4.618]	-0.210*** [-4.412]	-0.213*** [-4.604]	-0.205*** [-4.315]	-0.208*** [-4.366]
Age	0.00622 [0.588]	0.00636 [0.599]	0.00454 [0.430]	0.0114 [1.028]	0.00585 [0.554]	0.00959 [0.867]	0.00990 [0.896]
Age2	-6.52e-05 [-0.539]	-6.69e-05 [-0.553]	-4.71e-05 [-0.391]	-0.000119 [-0.939]	-5.77e-05 [-0.479]	-9.73e-05 [-0.767]	-0.000103 [-0.813]
Choice_Ctrl	0.256*** [8.971]	0.257*** [8.995]	0.253*** [8.862]	0.257*** [8.587]	0.253*** [8.873]	0.250*** [8.370]	0.252*** [8.448]
Town_Size	0.00418 [0.482]	0.00346 [0.398]	0.00353 [0.408]	-0.00447 [-0.504]	0.00259 [0.300]	-0.00396 [-0.449]	-0.00329 [-0.371]
_Istatus_1	0.144 [1.209]	0.155 [1.320]	0.141 [1.208]	0.121 [1.004]	0.135 [1.144]	0.0987 [0.806]	0.106 [0.855]
_Istatus_2	0.0872 [1.152]	0.0920 [1.221]	0.0918 [1.227]	0.0659 [0.850]	0.0703 [0.931]	0.0514 [0.658]	0.0650 [0.831]
_Istatus_3	0.458*** [3.056]	0.462*** [3.078]	0.446*** [2.950]	0.431*** [2.713]	0.440*** [3.006]	0.405** [2.580]	0.414*** [2.589]
_Istatus_6	-0.0225 [-0.171]	-0.0178 [-0.134]	-0.0233 [-0.174]	0.00758 [0.0547]	-0.0109 [-0.0840]	0.00271 [0.0199]	-0.00390 [-0.0281]
_Istatus_7	-0.130 [-1.064]	-0.133 [-1.076]	-0.136 [-1.099]	-0.160 [-1.270]	-0.112 [-0.908]	-0.139 [-1.093]	-0.158 [-1.236]
_Istatus_8	0.155 [1.042]	0.161 [1.080]	0.154 [1.034]	0.157 [1.010]	0.177 [1.189]	0.175 [1.120]	0.153 [0.979]
_Istatus_9	-0.631*** [-4.893]	-0.633*** [-4.894]	-0.610*** [-4.678]	-0.613*** [-4.554]	-0.637*** [-4.908]	-0.602*** [-4.441]	-0.592*** [-4.372]
_Istatus_10	0.0216 [0.174]	0.0196 [0.158]	0.0269 [0.214]	0.00798 [0.0638]	0.0328 [0.261]	0.0242 [0.189]	0.0166 [0.130]
Constant	-2.652*** [-6.137]	-2.680*** [-6.141]	-2.915*** [-6.806]	-2.763*** [-6.166]	-2.934*** [-6.714]	-3.140*** [-6.998]	-2.958*** [-6.569]
Observations	941	941	941	881	941	881	881
R-squared	0.365	0.365	0.372	0.362	0.374	0.372	0.367
Adjusted R-squared	0.349	0.348	0.355	0.344	0.357	0.352	0.347

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 8: Explaining log earnings (in PLN).

VARIABLES	(1) lnIncome	(2) lnIncome	(3) lnIncome	(4) lnIncome	(5) lnIncome	(6) lnIncome	(7) lnIncome
lnDegree	0.0171 [0.446]				0.00122 [0.0313]	0.0169 [0.395]	0.0174 [0.285]
lnCentrality		0.00898 [0.735]					0.00596 [0.299]
Bridging			-0.0127 [-0.550]			-0.0282 [-1.040]	-0.0162 [-0.638]
Bonding				-0.0223 [-0.321]		-0.00211 [-0.0293]	-0.0186 [-0.264]
Bridge_Net					0.0536* [1.726]	0.0704** [2.093]	
Trust	0.0504*** [3.041]	0.0509*** [3.051]	0.0497*** [2.969]	0.0541*** [3.181]	0.0452*** [2.711]	0.0460*** [2.651]	0.0531*** [3.053]
Trust_Net	0.0240 [0.525]	0.0258 [0.562]	0.0217 [0.480]	0.00230 [0.0496]	0.0157 [0.343]	-0.00436 [-0.0928]	0.00568 [0.121]
Cooperation	-0.0255 [-0.795]	-0.0270 [-0.840]	-0.0221 [-0.669]	-0.0240 [-0.717]	-0.0303 [-0.937]	-0.0259 [-0.756]	-0.0227 [-0.664]
Coop_Net	-0.100** [-2.073]	-0.102** [-2.098]	-0.0971** [-1.979]	-0.0962* [-1.910]	-0.103** [-2.132]	-0.0921* [-1.800]	-0.0947* [-1.836]
Pos_Affect	-0.0591 [-0.795]	-0.0625 [-0.835]	-0.0586 [-0.786]	-0.0418 [-0.523]	-0.0558 [-0.758]	-0.0489 [-0.605]	-0.0473 [-0.582]
_IP27_2	0.0581 [1.165]	0.0574 [1.157]	0.0564 [1.139]	0.0339 [0.649]	0.0577 [1.155]	0.0380 [0.728]	0.0363 [0.692]
_IP27_3	-0.151 [-1.434]	-0.155 [-1.470]	-0.149 [-1.406]	-0.157 [-1.395]	-0.149 [-1.413]	-0.162 [-1.452]	-0.163 [-1.440]
Education	0.119*** [4.253]	0.118*** [4.208]	0.120*** [4.300]	0.139*** [4.877]	0.118*** [4.250]	0.138*** [4.944]	0.138*** [4.866]
P25	0.159* [1.940]	0.161* [1.957]	0.155* [1.913]	0.196** [2.210]	0.167** [2.001]	0.207** [2.295]	0.196** [2.213]
P26	0.170*** [2.722]	0.170*** [2.727]	0.170*** [2.735]	0.173** [2.421]	0.167*** [2.659]	0.166** [2.350]	0.174** [2.459]
Female	-0.186*** [-5.364]	-0.185*** [-5.362]	-0.186*** [-5.376]	-0.191*** [-5.366]	-0.182*** [-5.271]	-0.186*** [-5.265]	-0.191*** [-5.382]
Age	0.0158* [1.911]	0.0157* [1.906]	0.0160** [1.970]	0.0172* [1.928]	0.0155* [1.882]	0.0172** [1.965]	0.0176** [1.998]
Age2	-0.000123 [-1.317]	-0.000122 [-1.305]	-0.000126 [-1.368]	-0.000136 [-1.345]	-0.000121 [-1.294]	-0.000137 [-1.376]	-0.000140 [-1.401]
Choice_Ctrl	0.0683*** [3.286]	0.0676*** [3.259]	0.0696*** [3.330]	0.0767*** [3.642]	0.0680*** [3.279]	0.0762*** [3.622]	0.0762*** [3.603]
Town_Size	0.00515 [0.844]	0.00527 [0.870]	0.00466 [0.778]	0.00452 [0.713]	0.00419 [0.682]	0.00408 [0.626]	0.00497 [0.768]
_Istatus_1	0.154* [1.935]	0.157** [1.976]	0.158** [1.986]	0.135* [1.680]	0.153* [1.916]	0.126 [1.565]	0.130 [1.607]
_Istatus_2	0.0778 [1.493]	0.0784 [1.508]	0.0779 [1.505]	0.0883 [1.625]	0.0722 [1.384]	0.0759 [1.403]	0.0854 [1.569]
_Istatus_3	0.497*** [4.915]	0.497*** [4.902]	0.496*** [4.917]	0.509*** [4.926]	0.491*** [4.879]	0.506*** [4.912]	0.510*** [4.906]
_Istatus_6	0.00156 [0.00934]	0.00229 [0.0137]	0.00244 [0.0146]	0.00914 [0.0550]	0.00742 [0.0450]	0.00987 [0.0595]	0.00573 [0.0341]
_Istatus_7	-0.0908 [-0.747]	-0.0841 [-0.690]	-0.0970 [-0.799]	-0.0591 [-0.468]	-0.0736 [-0.603]	-0.0269 [-0.214]	-0.0490 [-0.388]
_Istatus_8	-1.044*** [-3.357]	-1.039*** [-3.354]	-1.046*** [-3.369]	-1.032*** [-3.315]	-1.036*** [-3.419]	-1.008*** [-3.385]	-1.021*** [-3.295]
_Istatus_9	-0.249 [-1.078]	-0.244 [-1.067]	-0.257 [-1.112]	-0.102 [-0.421]	-0.253 [-1.095]	-0.114 [-0.470]	-0.106 [-0.435]
_Istatus_10	-0.0616 [-0.398]	-0.0591 [-0.381]	-0.0655 [-0.425]	-0.0354 [-0.226]	-0.0466 [-0.304]	-0.0167 [-0.108]	-0.0352 [-0.223]
Constant	6.674*** [21.05]	6.657*** [20.92]	6.695*** [20.63]	6.475*** [18.93]	6.553*** [19.93]	6.384*** [17.71]	6.495*** [17.97]
Observations	610	610	610	570	610	570	570
R-squared	0.431	0.431	0.431	0.439	0.434	0.445	0.440
Adjusted R-squared	0.407	0.408	0.407	0.414	0.410	0.417	0.412

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 9: Explaining life satisfaction.

VARIABLES	(1) Life_Satisf	(2) Life_Satisf	(3) Life_Satisf	(4) Life_Satisf	(5) Life_Satisf	(6) Life_Satisf	(7) Life_Satisf
lnDegree	0.403*** [3.297]				0.388*** [3.134]	0.426*** [3.228]	0.466** [2.542]
lnCentrality		0.109*** [2.592]					-0.0123 [-0.185]
Bridging			-0.00551 [-0.0730]			-0.0875 [-1.081]	-0.0725 [-0.904]
Bonding				0.279 [1.363]		0.356* [1.727]	0.321 [1.568]
Bridge_Net					0.0851 [0.942]	0.111 [1.181]	
Trust	0.00230 [0.0468]	0.00793 [0.161]	0.00494 [0.0991]	-0.00381 [-0.0754]	-0.00474 [-0.0963]	-0.0255 [-0.496]	-0.0159 [-0.311]
Trust_Net	-0.174 [-1.211]	-0.175 [-1.216]	-0.209 [-1.453]	-0.236 [-1.557]	-0.186 [-1.293]	-0.211 [-1.396]	-0.201 [-1.323]
Cooperation	0.229** [2.145]	0.223** [2.065]	0.240** [2.208]	0.260** [2.324]	0.224** [2.104]	0.254** [2.304]	0.259** [2.338]
Coop_Net	0.246 [1.459]	0.243 [1.441]	0.257 [1.510]	0.356** [1.992]	0.242 [1.438]	0.362** [2.033]	0.362** [2.037]
Pos_Affect	0.629*** [2.653]	0.603** [2.529]	0.647*** [2.729]	0.538** [2.087]	0.645*** [2.730]	0.517** [2.002]	0.509* [1.961]
Sociability	0.214*** [2.741]	0.216*** [2.749]	0.257*** [3.279]	0.269*** [3.378]	0.191** [2.365]	0.210** [2.514]	0.239*** [2.942]
Income_Rel2	0.683*** [8.480]	0.690*** [8.556]	0.694*** [8.566]	0.712*** [8.488]	0.674*** [8.270]	0.699*** [8.273]	0.709*** [8.453]
Education	0.114 [1.531]	0.106 [1.417]	0.106 [1.398]	0.0911 [1.181]	0.116 [1.564]	0.1000 [1.323]	0.0984 [1.306]
Female	0.115 [1.045]	0.119 [1.073]	0.124 [1.111]	0.0854 [0.748]	0.116 [1.054]	0.0729 [0.644]	0.0724 [0.640]
Age	-0.0377 [-1.557]	-0.0365 [-1.506]	-0.0359 [-1.470]	-0.0391 [-1.531]	-0.0381 [-1.576]	-0.0401 [-1.570]	-0.0398 [-1.551]
Age2	0.000299 [1.097]	0.000288 [1.055]	0.000278 [1.014]	0.000304 [1.052]	0.000304 [1.118]	0.000315 [1.093]	0.000311 [1.074]
Choice_Ctrl	0.368*** [5.457]	0.367*** [5.466]	0.381*** [5.664]	0.362*** [5.202]	0.369*** [5.477]	0.353*** [5.075]	0.353*** [5.047]
Town_Size	0.0138 [0.762]	0.0113 [0.624]	0.00529 [0.295]	0.0137 [0.741]	0.0129 [0.709]	0.0215 [1.149]	0.0223 [1.187]
P25	0.248 [0.755]	0.257 [0.786]	0.212 [0.650]	0.243 [0.703]	0.261 [0.793]	0.274 [0.784]	0.254 [0.732]
P26	0.241 [0.959]	0.236 [0.936]	0.238 [0.964]	0.199 [0.737]	0.234 [0.927]	0.202 [0.731]	0.216 [0.785]
_Istatus_7	0.556* [1.914]	0.569* [1.945]	0.478* [1.650]	0.478 [1.588]	0.571** [1.973]	0.586* [1.946]	0.558* [1.825]
_Istatus_8	0.529 [1.496]	0.587* [1.685]	0.538 [1.534]	0.545 [1.506]	0.554 [1.552]	0.571 [1.560]	0.532 [1.458]
_Istatus_9	-0.628* [-1.722]	-0.632* [-1.725]	-0.661* [-1.789]	-0.581 [-1.504]	-0.632* [-1.734]	-0.569 [-1.488]	-0.558 [-1.459]
_Istatus_10	0.423 [1.338]	0.408 [1.299]	0.378 [1.203]	0.387 [1.213]	0.435 [1.377]	0.446 [1.392]	0.433 [1.346]
_IP27_2	-0.217 [-1.446]	-0.224 [-1.482]	-0.216 [-1.418]	-0.193 [-1.229]	-0.217 [-1.439]	-0.187 [-1.212]	-0.191 [-1.229]
_IP27_3	-0.0788 [-0.329]	-0.0811 [-0.339]	-0.0614 [-0.258]	-0.0746 [-0.300]	-0.0731 [-0.306]	-0.0872 [-0.350]	-0.0909 [-0.364]
Widowed	-0.613*** [-3.251]	-0.600*** [-3.192]	-0.645*** [-3.414]	-0.675*** [-3.505]	-0.605*** [-3.214]	-0.629*** [-3.266]	-0.644*** [-3.322]
Constant	0.456 [0.455]	0.155 [0.155]	0.281 [0.282]	0.445 [0.412]	0.291 [0.285]	0.585 [0.532]	0.799 [0.733]
Observations	936	936	936	876	936	876	876
R-squared	0.380	0.378	0.373	0.361	0.381	0.371	0.370
Adjusted R-squared	0.365	0.363	0.357	0.343	0.365	0.351	0.350

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 10: Explaining happiness.

VARIABLES	(1) Happiness	(2) Happiness	(3) Happiness	(4) Happiness	(5) Happiness	(6) Happiness	(7) Happiness
InDegree	0.340*** [3.012]				0.343*** [3.017]	0.318*** [2.609]	0.261 [1.389]
InCentrality		0.113*** [2.910]					0.0239 [0.359]
Bridging			0.0844 [1.174]			0.0220 [0.291]	0.0174 [0.233]
Bonding				0.0193 [0.0977]		0.0513 [0.255]	0.0615 [0.311]
Bridge_Net					-0.0135 [-0.157]	-0.0316 [-0.351]	
Trust	0.0193 [0.387]	0.0245 [0.493]	0.0278 [0.553]	0.00460 [0.0897]	0.0204 [0.409]	0.00419 [0.0804]	0.00179 [0.0345]
Trust_Net	-0.197 [-1.231]	-0.192 [-1.200]	-0.223 [-1.397]	-0.295* [-1.743]	-0.195 [-1.220]	-0.261 [-1.535]	-0.261 [-1.536]
Cooperation	0.246** [2.331]	0.238** [2.233]	0.245** [2.292]	0.279** [2.545]	0.247** [2.338]	0.272** [2.490]	0.270** [2.461]
Coop_Net	0.200 [1.184]	0.195 [1.164]	0.191 [1.135]	0.292* [1.663]	0.200 [1.187]	0.282 [1.599]	0.280 [1.591]
Pos_Affect	0.451** [2.005]	0.421* [1.855]	0.482** [2.149]	0.418* [1.727]	0.449** [1.999]	0.406* [1.686]	0.405* [1.670]
Sociability	0.376*** [4.657]	0.369*** [4.594]	0.394*** [4.916]	0.423*** [5.197]	0.379*** [4.622]	0.394*** [4.619]	0.383*** [4.570]
Income_Rel2	0.480*** [6.255]	0.486*** [6.318]	0.480*** [6.225]	0.484*** [6.053]	0.482*** [6.163]	0.478*** [5.893]	0.476*** [5.968]
Education	0.211*** [3.030]	0.205*** [2.932]	0.208*** [2.977]	0.206*** [2.891]	0.211*** [3.021]	0.212*** [3.002]	0.211*** [2.994]
Female	0.102 [0.955]	0.104 [0.978]	0.111 [1.033]	0.0615 [0.562]	0.102 [0.954]	0.0540 [0.494]	0.0544 [0.498]
Age	-0.0598*** [-2.601]	-0.0589** [-2.569]	-0.0599*** [-2.603]	-0.0610** [-2.530]	-0.0598*** [-2.597]	-0.0624*** [-2.589]	-0.0622** [-2.572]
Age2	0.000596** [2.264]	0.000588** [2.239]	0.000595** [2.254]	0.000609** [2.194]	0.000595** [2.260]	0.000623** [2.250]	0.000621** [2.236]
Choice_Ctrl	0.356*** [5.338]	0.353*** [5.339]	0.366*** [5.473]	0.328*** [4.778]	0.356*** [5.331]	0.320*** [4.649]	0.320*** [4.654]
Town_Size	-0.00837 [-0.480]	-0.00935 [-0.546]	-0.0151 [-0.882]	-0.00709 [-0.402]	-0.00821 [-0.470]	7.81e-06 [0.000432]	-0.000234 [-0.0130]
P25	-0.135 [-0.410]	-0.119 [-0.362]	-0.145 [-0.440]	-0.102 [-0.287]	-0.138 [-0.415]	-0.0830 [-0.236]	-0.0735 [-0.210]
P26	0.403* [1.683]	0.398* [1.661]	0.398* [1.672]	0.380 [1.467]	0.404* [1.687]	0.394 [1.504]	0.391 [1.487]
_Istatus_7	-0.00630 [-0.0243]	0.0220 [0.0844]	-0.0681 [-0.265]	-0.0901 [-0.342]	-0.00877 [-0.0337]	-0.0340 [-0.128]	-0.0187 [-0.0698]
_Istatus_8	0.0740 [0.245]	0.133 [0.442]	0.0847 [0.282]	0.0659 [0.215]	0.0701 [0.230]	0.0543 [0.174]	0.0741 [0.239]
_Istatus_9	-0.732** [-2.478]	-0.730** [-2.499]	-0.742** [-2.498]	-0.664** [-2.222]	-0.731** [-2.473]	-0.630** [-2.106]	-0.635** [-2.126]
_Istatus_10	0.120 [0.443]	0.113 [0.419]	0.0925 [0.347]	0.0602 [0.221]	0.118 [0.435]	0.0953 [0.343]	0.0971 [0.351]
_IP27_2	-0.173 [-1.160]	-0.180 [-1.219]	-0.175 [-1.182]	-0.152 [-0.996]	-0.173 [-1.159]	-0.157 [-1.024]	-0.157 [-1.030]
_IP27_3	0.218 [1.104]	0.213 [1.084]	0.228 [1.163]	0.256 [1.272]	0.217 [1.098]	0.238 [1.170]	0.238 [1.174]
Widowed	-0.778*** [-3.818]	-0.758*** [-3.744]	-0.797*** [-3.922]	-0.886*** [-4.164]	-0.779*** [-3.819]	-0.859*** [-4.076]	-0.850*** [-4.032]
Constant	1.709* [1.749]	1.433 [1.467]	1.356 [1.377]	1.731 [1.647]	1.735* [1.736]	1.838* [1.705]	1.718 [1.587]
Observations	936	936	936	876	936	876	876
R-squared	0.359	0.360	0.354	0.336	0.359	0.342	0.342
Adjusted R-squared	0.343	0.343	0.337	0.318	0.342	0.322	0.322

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 11: Explaining social capital with individual traits and social variables.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	lnDegree	lnCentrality	Bridging	Bonding	lnDegree	lnCentrality	Bridging	Bonding
Sociability	0.105*** [5.814]	0.386*** [6.468]	0.216*** [6.541]	-0.0242 [-1.479]				
Pos_Affect	-0.00325 [-0.115]	0.231** [2.464]	-0.0211 [-0.419]	0.0201 [0.833]				
_IP27_2	-0.0829* [-1.787]	-0.172 [-1.219]	0.0116 [0.165]	-0.0554* [-1.672]				
_IP27_3	0.0276 [0.657]	-0.0119 [-0.0896]	-0.00697 [-0.103]	0.00387 [0.123]				
P25	-0.0830 [-1.500]	-0.439** [-2.066]	-0.175 [-1.588]	0.0663 [1.503]				
Choice_Ctrl	0.0343** [2.153]	0.147*** [2.852]	0.0315 [1.302]	0.00128 [0.111]				
Female	0.00464 [0.161]	0.0385 [0.428]	-0.0324 [-0.722]	0.0516** [2.483]	0.00707 [0.255]	0.0474 [0.523]	-0.0250 [-0.555]	0.0512** [2.484]
Town_Size	-0.0213*** [-4.038]	-0.0573*** [-3.324]	-0.00314 [-0.361]	-0.00732* [-1.906]	-0.0194*** [-3.726]	-0.0402** [-2.248]	0.00134 [0.157]	-0.00838** [-2.194]
_Istatus_1	0.257*** [3.210]	0.663*** [2.983]	0.128 [1.168]	0.0132 [0.287]	0.212*** [3.001]	0.659*** [3.405]	0.187* [1.918]	-0.0330 [-0.893]
_Istatus_2	0.0939* [1.793]	0.295** [2.056]	-0.00407 [-0.0558]	-0.0476 [-1.362]	0.0498 [1.089]	0.207 [1.559]	0.00556 [0.0814]	-0.0753** [-2.481]
_Istatus_7	-0.199*** [-5.050]	-0.749*** [-5.254]	-0.0159 [-0.219]	0.105*** [3.019]	-0.173*** [-5.359]	-0.711*** [-5.880]	-0.0270 [-0.463]	0.114*** [4.187]
_Istatus_9	-0.0806 [-1.283]	-0.0847 [-0.384]	-0.203 [-1.596]	0.0974* [1.764]	-0.0525 [-0.887]	-0.0341 [-0.169]	-0.199* [-1.698]	0.107** [2.045]
_Imarital_2	0.0585 [1.098]	0.569*** [3.648]	0.155* [1.946]	-0.0302 [-0.841]	0.0502 [0.951]	0.586*** [3.772]	0.158** [1.989]	-0.0331 [-0.920]
_Imarital_3	0.00720 [0.240]	0.202** [1.996]	0.143*** [2.830]	0.0301 [1.283]	0.00636 [0.215]	0.267*** [2.592]	0.157*** [3.073]	0.0252 [1.079]
_marital_4	0.104 [1.532]	0.600*** [3.245]	0.0367 [0.386]	0.00110 [0.0263]	0.0921 [1.314]	0.597*** [3.020]	0.0541 [0.554]	-0.00738 [-0.176]
Constant	-0.407*** [-2.614]	1.212** [2.059]	2.568*** [8.692]	0.162 [1.233]	-0.0569 [-1.053]	3.165*** [17.44]	3.075*** [37.33]	0.279*** [7.039]
Observations	977	977	977	906	983	983	983	912
R-squared	0.105	0.172	0.080	0.063	0.058	0.088	0.021	0.057
Adjusted R-squared	0.0914	0.159	0.0661	0.0473	0.0495	0.0797	0.0117	0.0473

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 12: Explaining generalized trust (individual and community-level effects).

VARIABLES	(1) Trust	(2) Trust	(3) Trust	(4) Trust	(5) Trust	(6) Trust	(7) Trust
lnDegree	0.0207 [0.263]				-0.0423 [-0.523]	0.0828 [0.989]	0.275** [2.240]
lnDegree_mean	0.132 [0.460]				-0.0917 [-0.314]	-0.221 [-0.713]	-0.974* [-1.949]
lnCentrality		-0.0329 [-1.337]					-0.0640 [-1.494]
lnCentr_mean		0.197** [2.378]					0.350** [2.205]
Bridging			-0.145*** [-2.947]			-0.231*** [-4.410]	-0.179*** [-3.353]
Bridging_mean			0.944** [2.171]			0.526 [1.002]	0.571 [1.072]
Bonding				-0.153 [-1.203]		-0.0691 [-0.553]	-0.191 [-1.495]
Bonding_mean				-0.129 [-0.285]		0.0755 [0.160]	0.130 [0.284]
Bridge_Net					0.276*** [4.472]	0.282*** [4.321]	
Bridge_Net_mean					0.266 [1.262]	0.205 [0.847]	
Cooperation	0.508*** [7.540]	0.509*** [7.571]	0.518*** [7.713]	0.525*** [7.339]	0.461*** [6.904]	0.492*** [7.018]	0.526*** [7.416]
Coop_Net	0.0158 [0.144]	0.0139 [0.128]	0.0442 [0.411]	-0.0226 [-0.194]	-0.0221 [-0.202]	0.00440 [0.0390]	0.0158 [0.138]
Pos_Affect	-0.215* [-1.671]	-0.197 [-1.536]	-0.241* [-1.896]	-0.180 [-1.316]	-0.209 [-1.634]	-0.234* [-1.745]	-0.201 [-1.483]
Female	-0.0535 [-0.788]	-0.0531 [-0.784]	-0.0605 [-0.897]	-0.0556 [-0.753]	-0.0399 [-0.595]	-0.0635 [-0.868]	-0.0785 [-1.066]
Age	0.00484 [0.329]	-0.00461 [-0.304]	-0.00486 [-0.303]	0.00836 [0.553]	-0.00544 [-0.358]	-0.00473 [-0.287]	-0.00560 [-0.334]
Age2	-7.75e-05 [-0.488]	3.25e-05 [0.198]	3.23e-05 [0.186]	-0.000117 [-0.719]	6.43e-05 [0.385]	5.77e-05 [0.320]	3.93e-05 [0.216]
Choice_Ctrl	0.161*** [4.128]	0.160*** [4.126]	0.164*** [4.291]	0.140*** [3.405]	0.143*** [3.707]	0.123*** [3.054]	0.137*** [3.362]
Town_Size	-0.0158 [-1.129]	-0.0145 [-1.108]	-0.0190 [-1.518]	-0.0176 [-1.290]	-0.0276* [-1.890]	-0.0228 [-1.483]	-0.0208 [-1.350]
_Istatus_1	0.230 [1.388]	0.181 [1.095]	0.229 [1.431]	0.268 [1.587]	0.190 [1.142]	0.238 [1.443]	0.252 [1.507]
_Istatus_8	0.219 [1.266]	0.182 [1.067]	0.228 [1.350]	0.242 [1.388]	0.291* [1.744]	0.308* [1.814]	0.223 [1.257]
Constant	1.098*** [2.584]	0.663 [1.512]	-1.263 [-1.020]	1.130** [2.271]	-0.121 [-0.191]	-0.932 [-0.659]	-0.916 [-0.628]
Observations	942	942	942	882	942	882	882
R-squared	0.102	0.107	0.114	0.100	0.131	0.144	0.123
Adjusted R-squared	0.0903	0.0957	0.102	0.0872	0.118	0.126	0.105

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 13: Explaining trust within one's network (individual and community-level effects).

VARIABLES	(1) Trust_Net	(2) Trust_Net	(3) Trust_Net	(4) Trust_Net	(5) Trust_Net	(6) Trust_Net	(7) Trust_Net
lnDegree	-0.0819 [-1.632]				-0.0919* [-1.804]	-0.101* [-1.860]	-0.143* [-1.672]
lnDegree_mean	-0.104 [-0.682]				-0.162 [-0.996]	-0.266 [-1.562]	0.109 [0.393]
lnCentrality		0.00241 [0.158]					0.0221 [0.828]
lnCentr_mean		-0.0510 [-1.059]					-0.167* [-1.789]
Bridging			-0.0321 [-1.029]			-0.0398 [-1.245]	-0.0365 [-1.150]
Bridging_mean			0.753** [2.299]			0.835** [2.155]	1.041*** [2.718]
Bonding				-0.129* [-1.772]		-0.122 [-1.608]	-0.136* [-1.820]
Bonding_mean				-0.197 [-0.788]		-0.232 [-0.843]	-0.251 [-0.967]
Bridge_Net					0.0631* [1.682]	0.0553 [1.418]	
Bridge_Net_mean					0.0775 [0.631]	-0.0433 [-0.304]	
Cooperation	0.319*** [7.182]	0.318*** [7.152]	0.321*** [7.192]	0.315*** [7.041]	0.310*** [6.928]	0.309*** [6.827]	0.315*** [6.983]
Sociability	0.250*** [8.618]	0.241*** [8.318]	0.247*** [8.520]	0.240*** [8.170]	0.233*** [7.668]	0.239*** [7.760]	0.247*** [8.325]
Female	-0.00612 [-0.154]	-0.00547 [-0.137]	-0.0186 [-0.462]	-0.0105 [-0.254]	-0.00379 [-0.0945]	-0.0162 [-0.380]	-0.0174 [-0.411]
Age	0.0106 [1.224]	0.0112 [1.267]	0.00180 [0.197]	0.00528 [0.593]	0.00799 [0.872]	0.000694 [0.0720]	0.00250 [0.262]
Age2	-9.81e-05 [-1.061]	-0.000103 [-1.088]	-6.56e-06 [-0.0682]	-2.57e-05 [-0.264]	-6.47e-05 [-0.655]	1.16e-05 [0.112]	-1.02e-05 [-0.0997]
Choice_Ctrl	0.0959*** [4.056]	0.0932*** [3.913]	0.0922*** [3.944]	0.0881*** [3.600]	0.0928*** [3.909]	0.0923*** [3.786]	0.0937*** [3.866]
Widowed	0.00944 [0.110]	0.00181 [0.0202]	0.186* [1.696]	0.0504 [0.581]	0.0247 [0.285]	0.183 [1.629]	0.176 [1.551]
Town_Size	0.00507 [0.680]	0.00746 [1.034]	0.00797 [1.119]	0.00351 [0.447]	0.00223 [0.275]	-0.00427 [-0.489]	-0.00290 [-0.341]
_Istatus_1	0.0111 [0.129]	0.00405 [0.0475]	-0.0536 [-0.634]	-0.0400 [-0.469]	-5.10e-05 [-0.000592]	-0.0216 [-0.240]	-0.0197 [-0.218]
_Istatus_8	0.0918 [0.894]	0.0825 [0.805]	0.0684 [0.676]	0.0580 [0.559]	0.109 [1.055]	0.105 [0.990]	0.0934 [0.881]
Constant	0.932*** [3.476]	1.135*** [3.970]	-1.103 [-1.124]	1.247*** [4.256]	0.637 [1.632]	-1.168 [-1.050]	-1.357 [-1.223]
Observations	937	937	937	877	937	877	877
R-squared	0.223	0.220	0.225	0.208	0.227	0.223	0.224
Adjusted R-squared	0.213	0.210	0.214	0.197	0.215	0.206	0.207

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .



Table 14: Explaining generalized willingness to cooperate (individual and community-level effects).

VARIABLES	(1) Cooperation	(2) Cooperation	(3) Cooperation	(4) Cooperation	(5) Cooperation	(6) Cooperation	(7) Cooperation
InDegree	0.0377 [0.990]				0.0218 [0.579]	-0.00295 [-0.0748]	-0.0320 [-0.515]
InDegree_mean	-0.0537 [-0.407]				-0.0578 [-0.407]	-0.00796 [-0.0511]	-0.0201 [-0.0888]
InCentrality		0.0211* [1.690]					0.0157 [0.735]
InCentr_mean		-0.0289 [-0.705]					0.0129 [0.170]
Bridging			0.0725*** [2.951]			0.0526** [2.035]	0.0593** [2.315]
Bridging_mean			-0.258 [-0.961]			-0.182 [-0.547]	-0.100 [-0.297]
Bonding				-0.0460 [-0.715]		-0.0190 [-0.296]	-0.0310 [-0.478]
Bonding_mean				0.445** [2.232]		0.485** [2.262]	0.449** [2.131]
Bridge_Net					0.0644** [2.197]	0.0401 [1.326]	
Bridge_Net_mean					-0.0170 [-0.179]	0.0736 [0.715]	
Trust	0.117*** [7.219]	0.119*** [7.327]	0.122*** [7.550]	0.117*** [7.130]	0.111*** [6.731]	0.116*** [6.936]	0.121*** [7.343]
Trust_Net	0.0500 [1.037]	0.0518 [1.083]	0.0481 [0.992]	0.0542 [1.114]	0.0379 [0.780]	0.0505 [1.024]	0.0579 [1.175]
Pos_Affect	0.277*** [4.538]	0.268*** [4.396]	0.276*** [4.542]	0.258*** [4.278]	0.280*** [4.598]	0.253*** [4.165]	0.248*** [4.059]
Female	0.0716** [2.159]	0.0715** [2.152]	0.0771** [2.314]	0.0631* [1.823]	0.0741** [2.219]	0.0640* [1.767]	0.0644* [1.789]
Age	-0.00699 [-1.001]	-0.00629 [-0.879]	-0.00590 [-0.769]	-0.00798 [-1.147]	-0.00720 [-0.963]	-0.00919 [-1.144]	-0.00829 [-1.051]
Age2	0.000121 [1.591]	0.000116 [1.482]	0.000111 [1.362]	0.000122 [1.592]	0.000127 [1.543]	0.000139 [1.603]	0.000126 [1.496]
Choice_Ctrl	0.0457** [2.194]	0.0443** [2.137]	0.0431** [2.094]	0.0478** [2.233]	0.0438** [2.105]	0.0420** [1.969]	0.0441** [2.073]
Widowed	-0.164** [-2.405]	-0.166** [-2.417]	-0.206** [-2.417]	-0.184** [-2.563]	-0.156** [-2.297]	-0.193** [-2.110]	-0.184** [-2.048]
Town_Size	0.00157 [0.243]	0.00200 [0.329]	0.00215 [0.363]	0.00373 [0.565]	0.000626 [0.0918]	0.00327 [0.429]	0.00430 [0.567]
_Istatus_8	0.0948 [1.178]	0.103 [1.283]	0.0874 [1.103]	0.0797 [1.000]	0.113 [1.404]	0.0839 [1.031]	0.0820 [0.998]
Constant	1.754*** [8.294]	1.792*** [8.083]	2.314*** [3.028]	1.717*** [7.932]	1.654*** [5.505]	1.817** [1.968]	1.769* [1.912]
Observations	942	942	942	882	942	882	882
R-squared	0.219	0.221	0.227	0.209	0.224	0.218	0.216
Adjusted R-squared	0.209	0.211	0.217	0.199	0.212	0.202	0.200

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 15: Explaining willingness to cooperate within one's network (individual and community-level effects).

VARIABLES	(1) Coop_Net	(2) Coop_Net	(3) Coop_Net	(4) Coop_Net	(5) Coop_Net	(6) Coop_Net	(7) Coop_Net
lnDegree	0.0765* [1.726]				0.0448 [1.004]	-0.00858 [-0.179]	-0.200** [-2.459]
lnDegree_mean	-0.304** [-2.003]				-0.343** [-2.148]	-0.329** [-2.008]	-0.128 [-0.502]
lnCentrality		0.0653*** [4.311]					0.0911*** [3.404]
lnCentr_mean		-0.0907* [-1.840]					-0.0882 [-0.993]
Bridging			0.0916*** [2.958]			0.0537* [1.651]	0.0667** [2.076]
Bridging_mean			0.269 [0.748]			0.311 [0.757]	0.392 [1.040]
Bonding				-0.0847 [-1.148]		-0.0348 [-0.450]	-0.0654 [-0.871]
Bonding_mean				-0.248 [-0.958]		-0.301 [-1.101]	-0.359 [-1.351]
Bridge_Net					0.131*** [3.727]	0.100*** [2.713]	
Bridge_Net_mean					0.0405 [0.348]	0.00365 [0.0265]	
Trust	-0.00750 [-0.413]	-0.00392 [-0.219]	-0.00427 [-0.239]	-0.0115 [-0.619]	-0.0231 [-1.261]	-0.0192 [-1.049]	-0.00498 [-0.275]
Female	0.0639 [1.638]	0.0613 [1.587]	0.0631 [1.632]	0.0637 [1.575]	0.0671* [1.730]	0.0662* [1.652]	0.0654 [1.629]
Age	-0.000768 [-0.0855]	-0.000126 [-0.0138]	-0.00760 [-0.798]	-0.00778 [-0.847]	-0.00295 [-0.309]	-0.0101 [-1.001]	-0.00754 [-0.759]
Age2	4.40e-05 [0.449]	4.46e-05 [0.445]	0.000118 [1.151]	0.000134 [1.335]	7.56e-05 [0.717]	0.000154 [1.395]	0.000126 [1.167]
Choice_Ctrl	0.123*** [5.084]	0.112*** [4.755]	0.119*** [5.017]	0.114*** [4.770]	0.115*** [4.793]	0.107*** [4.401]	0.107*** [4.586]
Widowed	-0.160* [-1.750]	-0.144 [-1.577]	-0.0639 [-0.541]	-0.108 [-1.169]	-0.131 [-1.438]	-0.0411 [-0.340]	-0.0411 [-0.358]
Town_Size	0.0135* [1.828]	0.0177** [2.494]	0.0173** [2.490]	0.00845 [1.121]	0.00962 [1.231]	0.00126 [0.151]	0.00209 [0.256]
_Istatus_1	0.182*** [2.656]	0.157** [2.275]	0.120* [1.774]	0.131* [1.895]	0.169** [2.467]	0.136* [1.923]	0.128* [1.816]
_Istatus_8	0.201** [2.052]	0.202** [2.085]	0.167* [1.771]	0.162 [1.637]	0.234** [2.380]	0.208** [2.063]	0.216** [2.152]
Constant	3.181*** [13.93]	3.278*** [13.09]	2.210** [2.054]	3.515*** [13.68]	2.735*** [7.626]	2.124* [1.871]	2.078* [1.886]
Observations	942	942	942	882	942	882	882
R-squared	0.070	0.086	0.077	0.056	0.088	0.077	0.082
Adjusted R-squared	0.0585	0.0754	0.0657	0.0440	0.0748	0.0593	0.0644

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 16: Explaining earnings (subjective scale; individual and community-level effects)

VARIABLES	(1) Income_Rel	(2) Income_Rel	(3) Income_Rel	(4) Income_Rel	(5) Income_Rel	(6) Income_Rel	(7) Income_Rel
lnDegree	0.0391 [0.722]				0.00787 [0.147]	-0.0194 [-0.345]	0.0293 [0.338]
lnDegree_mean	0.238 [1.248]				0.232 [1.215]	0.176 [0.860]	-0.0723 [-0.229]
lnCentrality		1.24e-06 [8.09e-05]					-0.0145 [-0.560]
lnCentr_mean		0.117* [1.804]					0.109 [0.979]
Bridging			0.0977*** [2.940]			0.0593* [1.688]	0.0789** [2.273]
Bridging_mean			0.696** [2.196]			0.623* [1.663]	0.576 [1.558]
Bonding				-0.142* [-1.713]		-0.0833 [-0.970]	-0.119 [-1.421]
Bonding_mean				-0.468 [-1.435]		-0.500 [-1.513]	-0.465 [-1.410]
Bridge_Net					0.131*** [3.153]	0.0987** [2.229]	
Bridge_Net_mean					0.0302 [0.165]	-0.00603 [-0.0303]	
Trust	0.118*** [5.055]	0.117*** [4.998]	0.122*** [5.268]	0.107*** [4.455]	0.107*** [4.496]	0.104*** [4.222]	0.111*** [4.603]
Trust_Net	0.182*** [2.615]	0.184*** [2.646]	0.177*** [2.580]	0.175** [2.412]	0.159** [2.294]	0.160** [2.217]	0.176** [2.411]
Cooperation	0.153*** [3.512]	0.153*** [3.508]	0.137*** [3.117]	0.163*** [3.506]	0.140*** [3.200]	0.142*** [3.049]	0.148*** [3.178]
Coop_Net	-0.0157 [-0.209]	-0.0155 [-0.206]	-0.0345 [-0.457]	-0.0721 [-0.931]	-0.0243 [-0.324]	-0.0855 [-1.095]	-0.0870 [-1.112]
Pos_Affect	-0.242** [-2.180]	-0.245** [-2.206]	-0.232** [-2.106]	-0.201* [-1.737]	-0.228** [-2.053]	-0.192* [-1.670]	-0.191* [-1.658]
_IP27_1	0.0144 [0.151]	0.0190 [0.199]	0.0251 [0.257]	-0.222*** [-3.008]	-0.000979 [-0.0101]	-0.221*** [-2.942]	-0.216*** [-2.838]
_IP27_2	0.222** [2.104]	0.225** [2.129]	0.216** [2.023]		0.211** [1.973]		
_IP27_3				-0.188* [-1.699]		-0.189* [-1.682]	-0.195* [-1.738]
Education	0.0926*** [2.804]	0.0902*** [2.737]	0.0912*** [2.793]	0.0992*** [2.883]	0.0909*** [2.768]	0.0965*** [2.835]	0.0979*** [2.863]
P25	0.434*** [2.864]	0.426*** [2.800]	0.436*** [2.873]	0.449*** [2.816]	0.452*** [2.929]	0.467*** [2.853]	0.446*** [2.768]
P26	0.124 [1.195]	0.125 [1.204]	0.119 [1.150]	0.160 [1.363]	0.110 [1.036]	0.134 [1.133]	0.153 [1.312]
Female	-0.216*** [-4.648]	-0.214*** [-4.607]	-0.210*** [-4.545]	-0.189*** [-3.910]	-0.211*** [-4.555]	-0.179*** [-3.706]	-0.182*** [-3.766]
Age	0.00469 [0.440]	0.00255 [0.236]	-0.00367 [-0.324]	0.0106 [0.959]	0.00394 [0.363]	0.000389 [0.0324]	-0.000770 [-0.0644]
Age2	-4.83e-05 [-0.397]	-2.97e-05 [-0.243]	3.86e-05 [0.300]	-0.000112 [-0.880]	-3.74e-05 [-0.304]	-1.74e-06 [-0.0128]	4.69e-06 [0.0345]
Choice_Ctrl	0.255*** [8.923]	0.256*** [8.935]	0.251*** [8.832]	0.259*** [8.662]	0.251*** [8.802]	0.252*** [8.492]	0.254*** [8.574]
Town_Size	0.00851 [0.908]	0.00670 [0.746]	0.00370 [0.429]	-0.00896 [-0.969]	0.00645 [0.659]	-0.00550 [-0.535]	-0.00610 [-0.616]
status	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	941	941	941	881	941	881	881
R-squared	0.366	0.367	0.375	0.364	0.375	0.377	0.374
Adjusted R-squared	0.349	0.349	0.358	0.345	0.356	0.355	0.351

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 17: Explaining log earnings (in PLN; individual and community-level effects).

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	lnIncome	lnIncome	lnIncome	lnIncome	lnIncome	lnIncome	lnIncome
lnDegree	0.0288 [0.708]				0.0125 [0.297]	0.0307 [0.672]	0.0258 [0.404]
lnDegree_mean	-0.155 [-1.071]				-0.160 [-1.107]	-0.108 [-0.682]	-0.425* [-1.680]
lnCentrality		0.0117 [0.939]					0.00789 [0.391]
lnCentr_mean		-0.0337 [-0.758]					0.143* [1.704]
Bridging			-0.00688 [-0.295]			-0.0238 [-0.882]	-0.00678 [-0.264]
Bridging_mean			-0.477** [-2.134]			-0.578** [-2.288]	-0.678** [-2.584]
Bonding				-0.0101 [-0.139]		0.00476 [0.0636]	-0.0168 [-0.230]
Bonding_mean				-0.208 [-0.947]		-0.259 [-1.181]	-0.262 [-1.162]
Bridge_Net					0.0606* [1.915]	0.0813** [2.423]	
Bridge_Net_mean					-0.0842 [-0.752]	0.0333 [0.272]	
Trust	0.0498*** [2.992]	0.0512*** [3.069]	0.0511*** [3.041]	0.0556*** [3.219]	0.0439*** [2.613]	0.0486*** [2.729]	0.0549*** [3.092]
Trust_Net	0.0269 [0.584]	0.0264 [0.573]	0.0231 [0.510]	0.00279 [0.0601]	0.0176 [0.381]	-0.00165 [-0.0351]	0.0147 [0.313]
Cooperation	-0.0251 [-0.782]	-0.0267 [-0.832]	-0.0207 [-0.630]	-0.0226 [-0.676]	-0.0291 [-0.901]	-0.0229 [-0.673]	-0.0208 [-0.608]
Coop_Net	-0.100** [-2.074]	-0.102** [-2.100]	-0.102** [-2.074]	-0.100* [-1.952]	-0.104** [-2.159]	-0.103** [-2.093]	-0.110** [-1.984]
Pos_Affect	-0.0655 [-0.867]	-0.0647 [-0.855]	-0.0512 [-0.682]	-0.0395 [-0.493]	-0.0594 [-0.792]	-0.0430 [-0.527]	-0.0428 [-0.525]
_IP27_1	-0.0573 [-1.152]	0.155 [1.471]	-0.0592 [-1.195]	0.156 [1.378]	-0.0569 [-1.142]	0.166 [1.460]	0.171 [1.497]
_IP27_2		0.212** [2.010]		0.189* [1.663]		0.204* [1.783]	0.206* [1.795]
_IP27_3	-0.212** [-1.992]		-0.208** [-1.975]		-0.206* [-1.947]		
Education	0.119*** [4.262]	0.118*** [4.251]	0.123*** [4.402]	0.139*** [4.894]	0.118*** [4.248]	0.142*** [5.127]	0.137*** [4.913]
P25	0.156* [1.892]	0.163** [1.993]	0.167** [2.055]	0.194** [2.176]	0.165** [1.973]	0.219** [2.363]	0.196** [2.130]
P26	0.171*** [2.691]	0.169*** [2.695]	0.167*** [2.633]	0.172** [2.424]	0.169*** [2.662]	0.163** [2.231]	0.184** [2.513]
Female	-0.186*** [-5.364]	-0.186*** [-5.378]	-0.188*** [-5.468]	-0.182*** [-5.007]	-0.182*** [-5.263]	-0.174*** [-4.859]	-0.176*** [-4.886]
Age	0.0167** [2.006]	0.0168** [2.006]	0.0219** [2.487]	0.0169* [1.905]	0.0177** [2.069]	0.0245*** [2.586]	0.0241** [2.538]
Age2	-0.000133 [-1.415]	-0.000132 [-1.402]	-0.000188* [-1.890]	-0.000134 [-1.324]	-0.000143 [-1.489]	-0.000214** [-1.997]	-0.000212** [-1.965]
Choice_Ctrl	0.0705*** [3.361]	0.0691*** [3.286]	0.0737*** [3.519]	0.0782*** [3.715]	0.0716*** [3.398]	0.0830*** [3.899]	0.0825*** [3.892]
Town_Size	0.00206 [0.286]	0.00426 [0.657]	0.00452 [0.758]	0.00243 [0.363]	0.00196 [0.258]	-0.00120 [-0.143]	-0.00192 [-0.236]
status	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	610	610	610	570	610	570	570
R-squared	0.432	0.431	0.436	0.440	0.435	0.454	0.450
Adjusted R-squared	0.407	0.407	0.412	0.414	0.409	0.423	0.419

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 18: Explaining life satisfaction (individual and community-level effects).

VARIABLES	(1) Life_Satisf	(2) Life_Satisf	(3) Life_Satisf	(4) Life_Satisf	(5) Life_Satisf	(6) Life_Satisf	(7) Life_Satisf
lnDegree	0.439*** [3.483]				0.427*** [3.329]	0.459*** [3.405]	0.537*** [2.803]
lnDegree_mean	-0.507 [-1.167]				-0.591 [-1.356]	-0.498 [-1.151]	-0.650 [-0.895]
lnCentrality		0.111** [2.550]					-0.0300 [-0.430]
lnCentr_mean		-0.0346 [-0.252]					0.0741 [0.306]
Bridging			-0.0112 [-0.148]			-0.0894 [-1.105]	-0.0760 [-0.946]
Bridging_mean			1.219 [1.204]			1.073 [0.925]	1.250 [1.154]
Bonding				0.234 [1.121]		0.305 [1.465]	0.273 [1.311]
Bonding_mean				0.853 [1.212]		0.932 [1.327]	0.974 [1.363]
Bridge_Net					0.0628 [0.681]	0.0923 [0.954]	
Bridge_Net_mean					0.447 [1.283]	0.174 [0.438]	
Trust	6.74e-05 [0.00138]	0.00811 [0.165]	0.00352 [0.0706]	-0.00785 [-0.154]	-0.00536 [-0.109]	-0.0318 [-0.615]	-0.0253 [-0.492]
Trust_Net	-0.168 [-1.172]	-0.176 [-1.216]	-0.220 [-1.536]	-0.236 [-1.553]	-0.183 [-1.289]	-0.218 [-1.443]	-0.208 [-1.369]
Cooperation	0.228** [2.145]	0.223** [2.060]	0.243** [2.236]	0.251** [2.249]	0.221** [2.081]	0.244** [2.223]	0.251** [2.270]
Coop_Net	0.247 [1.463]	0.243 [1.440]	0.261 [1.542]	0.364** [2.028]	0.242 [1.438]	0.374** [2.096]	0.377** [2.113]
Pos_Affect	0.619*** [2.607]	0.603** [2.526]	0.645*** [2.724]	0.540** [2.092]	0.631*** [2.666]	0.511** [1.971]	0.506* [1.947]
Sociability	0.209*** [2.683]	0.214*** [2.738]	0.256*** [3.283]	0.264*** [3.303]	0.194** [2.414]	0.206** [2.474]	0.231*** [2.859]
Income_Rel2	0.685*** [8.501]	0.691*** [8.576]	0.687*** [8.453]	0.715*** [8.540]	0.676*** [8.311]	0.700*** [8.273]	0.708*** [8.424]
Education	0.119 [1.583]	0.107 [1.422]	0.105 [1.395]	0.0971 [1.255]	0.119 [1.592]	0.109 [1.432]	0.109 [1.433]
Female	0.116 [1.054]	0.119 [1.078]	0.110 [0.992]	0.0476 [0.408]	0.113 [1.032]	0.0201 [0.174]	0.0159 [0.138]
Age	-0.0354 [-1.454]	-0.0357 [-1.477]	-0.0454* [-1.803]	-0.0381 [-1.494]	-0.0405* [-1.667]	-0.0473* [-1.811]	-0.0476* [-1.828]
Age2	0.000276 [1.006]	0.000281 [1.034]	0.000358 [1.282]	0.000296 [1.026]	0.000318 [1.166]	0.000370 [1.269]	0.000372 [1.268]
Choice_Ctrl	0.369*** [5.479]	0.367*** [5.465]	0.385*** [5.699]	0.356*** [5.106]	0.367*** [5.461]	0.351*** [4.966]	0.352*** [4.991]
Town_Size	0.00507 [0.243]	0.0104 [0.543]	0.00452 [0.253]	0.0220 [1.092]	-0.00346 [-0.159]	0.0193 [0.815]	0.0218 [0.955]
P25	0.250 [0.767]	0.259 [0.792]	0.179 [0.541]	0.250 [0.724]	0.258 [0.781]	0.242 [0.683]	0.212 [0.603]
P26	0.244 [0.968]	0.236 [0.936]	0.231 [0.942]	0.202 [0.748]	0.229 [0.908]	0.213 [0.767]	0.230 [0.836]
status yes							
Widowed	-0.653*** [-3.412]	-0.615*** [-3.101]	-0.397 [-1.406]	-0.688*** [-3.558]	-0.601*** [-3.094]	-0.448 [-1.524]	-0.427 [-1.474]
Constant	0.332 [0.328]	0.166 [0.155]	-3.268 [-1.051]	0.0189 [0.0172]	-1.009 [-0.724]	-3.435 [-1.040]	-3.465 [-1.047]
Observations	936	936	936	876	936	876	876
R-squared	0.381	0.378	0.374	0.361	0.383	0.373	0.372
Adjusted R-squared	0.365	0.362	0.357	0.343	0.365	0.351	0.350

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 19: Explaining happiness (individual and community-level effects).

VARIABLES	(1) Happiness	(2) Happiness	(3) Happiness	(4) Happiness	(5) Happiness	(6) Happiness	(7) Happiness
lnDegree	0.332*** [2.758]				0.336*** [2.774]	0.312** [2.429]	0.249 [1.254]
lnDegree_mean	0.120 [0.279]				0.0556 [0.130]	0.0518 [0.122]	0.740 [1.038]
lnCentrality		0.112*** [2.794]					0.0264 [0.385]
lnCentr_mean		0.0116 [0.0866]					-0.317 [-1.378]
Bridging			0.0760 [1.059]			0.0202 [0.268]	0.00867 [0.117]
Bridging_mean			1.821* [1.890]			1.326 [1.260]	1.687* [1.722]
Bonding				-0.0354 [-0.176]		0.00338 [0.0166]	0.0223 [0.111]
Bonding_mean				1.033 [1.545]		1.152* [1.723]	1.211* [1.797]
Bridge_Net					-0.0345 [-0.392]	-0.0482 [-0.519]	
Bridge_Net_mean					0.385 [1.086]	0.0721 [0.184]	
Trust	0.0198 [0.398]	0.0245 [0.491]	0.0256 [0.512]	-0.000294 [-0.00572]	0.0225 [0.449]	-0.00115 [-0.0220]	-0.00195 [-0.0375]
Trust_Net	-0.199 [-1.240]	-0.192 [-1.198]	-0.240 [-1.503]	-0.294* [-1.736]	-0.199 [-1.247]	-0.270 [-1.585]	-0.285* [-1.682]
Cooperation	0.246** [2.329]	0.238** [2.230]	0.250** [2.338]	0.268** [2.453]	0.245** [2.323]	0.263** [2.407]	0.260** [2.381]
Coop_Net	0.200 [1.182]	0.195 [1.163]	0.198 [1.176]	0.302* [1.706]	0.200 [1.178]	0.298* [1.675]	0.302* [1.705]
Pos_Affect	0.454** [2.018]	0.421* [1.854]	0.479** [2.142]	0.421* [1.734]	0.448** [2.000]	0.403* [1.669]	0.414* [1.714]
Sociability	0.377*** [4.663]	0.370*** [4.610]	0.393*** [4.957]	0.417*** [5.120]	0.387*** [4.745]	0.390*** [4.633]	0.373*** [4.530]
Income_Rel2	0.480*** [6.255]	0.485*** [6.325]	0.470*** [6.110]	0.488*** [6.114]	0.482*** [6.175]	0.477*** [5.896]	0.475*** [6.004]
Education	0.210*** [2.994]	0.204*** [2.911]	0.207*** [2.968]	0.213*** [2.990]	0.208*** [2.958]	0.217*** [3.054]	0.221*** [3.105]
Female	0.102 [0.953]	0.104 [0.976]	0.0906 [0.844]	0.0158 [0.138]	0.0988 [0.924]	-0.0132 [-0.115]	-0.0155 [-0.136]
Age	-0.0604*** [-2.601]	-0.0592** [-2.547]	-0.0742*** [-3.100]	-0.0597** [-2.484]	-0.0644*** [-2.741]	-0.0727*** [-2.929]	-0.0706*** [-2.840]
Age2	0.000601** [2.267]	0.000590** [2.229]	0.000715*** [2.653]	0.000599** [2.164]	0.000633** [2.373]	0.000710** [2.526]	0.000700** [2.488]
Choice_Ctrl	0.356*** [5.335]	0.353*** [5.337]	0.373*** [5.581]	0.320*** [4.667]	0.354*** [5.313]	0.318*** [4.601]	0.317*** [4.603]
Town_Size	-0.00629 [-0.325]	-0.00906 [-0.504]	-0.0163 [-0.948]	0.00304 [0.163]	-0.0125 [-0.612]	0.0105 [0.489]	0.0155 [0.750]
P25	-0.136 [-0.412]	-0.120 [-0.364]	-0.194 [-0.596]	-0.0924 [-0.259]	-0.143 [-0.431]	-0.118 [-0.334]	-0.0982 [-0.280]
P26	0.403* [1.681]	0.398* [1.661]	0.388 [1.639]	0.384 [1.476]	0.397* [1.654]	0.395 [1.504]	0.383 [1.464]
status widowed	yes -0.769*** [-3.734]	yes -0.753*** [-3.552]	yes -0.427 [-1.480]	yes -0.901*** [-4.288]	yes -0.732*** [-3.456]	yes -0.595** [-2.027]	yes -0.614** [-2.089]
Constant	1.938* [1.953]	1.615 [1.571]	-3.628 [-1.236]	1.296 [1.197]	0.948 [0.684]	-2.614 [-0.857]	-2.645 [-0.869]
Observations	936	936	936	876	936	876	876
R-squared	0.359	0.360	0.357	0.338	0.360	0.346	0.347
Adjusted R-squared	0.342	0.343	0.340	0.319	0.341	0.323	0.324

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 20: Explaining generalized trust (micro–macro interactions).

VARIABLES	(1) Trust	(2) Trust	(3) Trust	(4) Trust	(5) Trust	(6) Trust	(7) Trust
ln_Dij	0.0446 [0.512]				-0.0304 [-0.338]	0.0931 [0.985]	0.318** [2.301]
ln_Dj	0.124 [0.435]				-0.110 [-0.379]	-0.191 [-0.612]	-0.893* [-1.755]
ln_Dij_ln_Dj	-0.326 [-0.713]				-0.180 [-0.392]	-0.138 [-0.293]	-0.597 [-1.100]
ln_Cij		-0.0322 [-1.303]					-0.0670 [-1.511]
ln_Cj		0.204** [2.419]					0.344** [2.130]
ln_Cij_ln_Cj		0.0288 [0.674]					0.0535 [1.004]
Bridging_ij			-0.146*** [-2.964]			-0.228*** [-4.302]	-0.175*** [-3.277]
Bridging_j			0.936** [2.122]			0.468 [0.869]	0.579 [1.063]
Bridging_ij_Bridging_j			-0.0899 [-0.169]			0.0378 [0.0695]	-0.173 [-0.303]
Fam_ij				-0.180 [-1.392]		-0.0944 [-0.738]	-0.215* [-1.648]
Fam_j				-0.0577 [-0.127]		0.123 [0.259]	0.253 [0.542]
Fam_ij_Fam_j				1.495 [1.191]		1.091 [0.881]	1.728 [1.375]
Avg_C_ij					0.270*** [4.341]	0.274*** [4.143]	
Avg_C_j					0.284 [1.360]	0.219 [0.909]	
Avg_C_ij_Avg_C_j					-0.221 [-0.944]	-0.167 [-0.708]	
Cooperation	0.505*** [7.499]	0.512*** [7.620]	0.517*** [7.701]	0.529*** [7.411]	0.455*** [6.798]	0.491*** [6.984]	0.531*** [7.527]
Coop_Net	0.0149 [0.136]	0.0158 [0.146]	0.0431 [0.400]	-0.0285 [-0.246]	-0.0206 [-0.189]	1.02e-05 [9.01e-05]	0.00919 [0.0805]
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	942	942	942	882	942	882	882
R-squared	0.102	0.108	0.114	0.101	0.132	0.145	0.126
Adjusted R-squared	0.0897	0.0951	0.101	0.0876	0.117	0.123	0.104

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 21: Explaining trust within one's network (micro-macro interactions).

VARIABLES	(1) Trust_Net	(2) Trust_Net	(3) Trust_Net	(4) Trust_Net	(5) Trust_Net	(6) Trust_Net	(7) Trust_Net
ln_Dij	-0.125** [-2.364]				-0.135** [-2.498]	-0.153*** [-2.667]	-0.226** [-2.535]
ln_Dj	-0.0987 [-0.646]				-0.144 [-0.886]	-0.281 [-1.634]	-0.00762 [-0.0268]
ln_Dij ln_Dj	0.576** [2.165]				0.577** [2.134]	0.693** [2.423]	1.008*** [2.953]
ln_Cij		0.00184 [0.120]					0.0307 [1.131]
ln_Cj		-0.0543 [-1.127]					-0.131 [-1.375]
ln_Cij ln_Cj		-0.0282 [-1.139]					-0.0629* [-1.851]
Bridging_ij			-0.0311 [-0.989]			-0.0440 [-1.365]	-0.0401 [-1.253]
Bridging_j			0.760** [2.314]			0.912** [2.363]	1.018*** [2.641]
Bridging_ij Bridging_j			0.117 [0.399]			0.0141 [0.0464]	0.0681 [0.227]
Fam_ij				-0.134* [-1.806]		-0.111 [-1.428]	-0.141* [-1.855]
Fam_j				-0.185 [-0.710]		-0.206 [-0.722]	-0.256 [-0.931]
Fam_ij Fam_j				0.255 [0.329]		-0.310 [-0.386]	-0.232 [-0.295]
Avg_C_ij					0.0705* [1.868]	0.0656* [1.651]	
Avg_C_j					0.0448 [0.362]	-0.0801 [-0.555]	
Avg_C_ij Avg_C_j					0.146 [1.201]	0.140 [1.109]	
Cooperation	0.322*** [7.252]	0.315*** [7.084]	0.322*** [7.209]	0.315*** [7.067]	0.314*** [7.054]	0.313*** [6.924]	0.312*** [6.961]
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	937	937	937	877	937	877	877
R-squared	0.226	0.221	0.225	0.208	0.231	0.228	0.230
Adjusted R-squared	0.215	0.210	0.214	0.196	0.218	0.208	0.210

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .



Table 22: Explaining generalized willingness to cooperate (micro–macro interactions).

VARIABLES	(1) Cooperation	(2) Cooperation	(3) Cooperation	(4) Cooperation	(5) Cooperation	(6) Cooperation	(7) Cooperation
ln_Dij	0.0590 [1.385]				0.0395 [0.936]	0.00897 [0.201]	-0.0159 [-0.220]
ln_Dj	-0.0538 [-0.410]				-0.0624 [-0.440]	-0.0263 [-0.170]	-0.0189 [-0.0831]
ln_Dij ln_Dj	-0.288 [-1.187]				-0.243 [-1.016]	-0.189 [-0.782]	0.0705 [0.217]
ln_Cij		0.0200 [1.608]					0.00927 [0.423]
ln_Cj		-0.0318 [-0.776]					0.00398 [0.0517]
ln_Cij ln_Cj		-0.0434* [-1.806]					-0.0438 [-1.338]
Bridging_ij			0.0710*** [2.894]			0.0525** [2.020]	0.0565** [2.189]
Bridging_j			-0.266 [-0.986]			-0.219 [-0.652]	-0.0866 [-0.257]
Bridging_ij Bridging_j			-0.153 [-0.565]			-0.0370 [-0.133]	-0.0524 [-0.184]
Fam_ij				-0.0292 [-0.451]		-0.00735 [-0.113]	-0.0232 [-0.356]
Fam_j				0.396* [1.962]		0.424* [1.961]	0.354* [1.661]
Fam_ij Fam_j				-0.929 [-1.482]		-0.849 [-1.356]	-0.795 [-1.255]
Avg_C_ij					0.0598** [2.028]	0.0371 [1.221]	
Avg_C_j					0.00494 [0.0514]	0.103 [0.996]	
Avg_C_ij Avg_C_j					-0.129 [-1.231]	-0.123 [-1.181]	
Trust	0.117*** [7.179]	0.119*** [7.368]	0.122*** [7.551]	0.118*** [7.210]	0.110*** [6.653]	0.115*** [6.916]	0.122*** [7.431]
Trust_Net	0.0514 [1.068]	0.0480 [1.012]	0.0473 [0.977]	0.0547 [1.130]	0.0396 [0.819]	0.0515 [1.050]	0.0533 [1.095]
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	942	942	942	882	942	882	882
R-squared	0.220	0.224	0.227	0.212	0.226	0.222	0.220
Adjusted R-squared	0.209	0.213	0.216	0.200	0.212	0.202	0.200

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 23: Explaining willingness to cooperate within one's network (micro-macro interactions).

VARIABLES	(1) Coop_Net	(2) Coop_Net	(3) Coop_Net	(4) Coop_Net	(5) Coop_Net	(6) Coop_Net	(7) Coop_Net
ln_Dij	0.0664 [1.392]				0.0331 [0.687]	-0.0128 [-0.249]	-0.241*** [-2.987]
ln_Dj	-0.303** [-2.004]				-0.334** [-2.118]	-0.313* [-1.878]	-0.197 [-0.749]
ln_Dij_ln_Dj	0.137 [0.511]				0.172 [0.640]	0.0839 [0.282]	0.751** [2.135]
ln_Cij		0.0639*** [4.228]					0.0911*** [3.462]
ln_Cj		-0.0955* [-1.962]					-0.0606 [-0.670]
ln_Cij_ln_Cj		-0.0455 [-1.529]					-0.0778** [-2.014]
Bridging_ij			0.0888*** [2.907]			0.0505 [1.569]	0.0608* [1.908]
Bridging_j			0.250 [0.699]			0.306 [0.750]	0.342 [0.908]
Bridging_ij_Bridging_j			-0.270 [-0.731]			-0.265 [-0.719]	-0.228 [-0.608]
Fam_ij				-0.0937 [-1.230]		-0.0369 [-0.461]	-0.0827 [-1.061]
Fam_j				-0.222 [-0.833]		-0.263 [-0.934]	-0.350 [-1.261]
Fam_ij_Fam_j				0.503 [0.633]		0.298 [0.360]	0.416 [0.515]
Avg_C_ij					0.135*** [3.854]	0.102*** [2.770]	
Avg_C_j					0.0185 [0.157]	-0.0135 [-0.0972]	
Avg_C_ij_Avg_C_j					0.178 [1.321]	0.178 [1.318]	
Trust	-0.00722 [-0.397]	-0.00390 [-0.218]	-0.00452 [-0.253]	-0.0118 [-0.639]	-0.0216 [-1.180]	-0.0181 [-0.995]	-0.00462 [-0.256]
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	942	942	942	882	942	882	882
R-squared	0.070	0.089	0.077	0.056	0.090	0.080	0.090
Adjusted R-squared	0.0577	0.0773	0.0655	0.0434	0.0752	0.0578	0.0677

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 24: Explaining earnings (subjective scale; micro–macro interactions).

VARIABLES	(1) Income_Rel	(2) Income_Rel	(3) Income_Rel	(4) Income_Rel	(5) Income_Rel	(6) Income_Rel	(7) Income_Rel
ln_Dij	0.0379 [0.635]				0.00252 [0.0422]	-0.0155 [-0.243]	0.0421 [0.438]
ln_Dj	0.238 [1.252]				0.243 [1.268]	0.172 [0.843]	-0.0502 [-0.158]
ln_Dij_ln_Dj	0.0156 [0.0463]				0.0789 [0.238]	-0.0439 [-0.123]	-0.248 [-0.603]
ln_Cij		0.000647 [0.0423]					-0.0149 [-0.570]
ln_Cj		0.129** [2.005]					0.101 [0.910]
ln_Cij_ln_Cj		0.0361 [1.202]					0.0296 [0.822]
Bridging_ij			0.0947*** [2.878]			0.0549 [1.561]	0.0765** [2.218]
Bridging_j			0.669** [2.096]			0.641* [1.667]	0.570 [1.525]
Bridging_ij_Bridging_j			-0.295 [-0.788]			-0.303 [-0.782]	-0.323 [-0.832]
Fam_ij				-0.126 [-1.513]		-0.0686 [-0.791]	-0.106 [-1.263]
Fam_j				-0.517 [-1.545]		-0.530 [-1.549]	-0.470 [-1.378]
Fam_ij_Fam_j				-0.814 [-0.892]		-0.694 [-0.765]	-0.492 [-0.547]
Avg_C_ij					0.134*** [3.231]	0.102** [2.288]	
Avg_C_j					0.0206 [0.111]	-0.0112 [-0.0554]	
Avg_C_ij_Avg_C_j					0.0987 [0.614]	0.209 [1.225]	
Trust	0.118*** [5.038]	0.116*** [4.981]	0.122*** [5.258]	0.108*** [4.506]	0.107*** [4.519]	0.106*** [4.279]	0.111*** [4.569]
Trust_Net	0.182*** [2.609]	0.187*** [2.679]	0.175** [2.569]	0.174** [2.410]	0.159** [2.276]	0.158** [2.174]	0.176** [2.405]
Cooperation	0.153*** [3.517]	0.157*** [3.573]	0.136*** [3.103]	0.161*** [3.465]	0.142*** [3.225]	0.143*** [3.062]	0.148*** [3.173]
Coop_Net	-0.0157 [-0.208]	-0.0134 [-0.179]	-0.0377 [-0.500]	-0.0692 [-0.886]	-0.0251 [-0.334]	-0.0877 [-1.112]	-0.0870 [-1.100]
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	941	941	941	881	941	881	881
R-squared	0.366	0.368	0.376	0.364	0.375	0.380	0.375
Adjusted R-squared	0.348	0.350	0.358	0.345	0.355	0.354	0.349

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 25: Explaining log earnings (in PLN; micro–macro interactions).

VARIABLES	(1) lnIncome	(2) lnIncome	(3) lnIncome	(4) lnIncome	(5) lnIncome	(6) lnIncome	(7) lnIncome
ln_Dij	0.0213 [0.465]				0.0143 [0.303]	0.0325 [0.642]	0.00493 [0.0699]
ln_Dj	-0.146 [-1.026]				-0.123 [-0.861]	-0.0929 [-0.565]	-0.428* [-1.666]
ln_Dij ln_Dj	0.124 [0.533]				0.105 [0.465]	0.132 [0.548]	-0.0987 [-0.326]
ln_Cij		0.0144 [1.183]					0.0182 [0.926]
ln_Cj		-0.0219 [-0.489]					0.157* [1.812]
ln_Cij ln_Cj		0.0348 [1.583]					0.0598** [2.236]
Bridging_ij			-0.00654 [-0.291]			-0.0277 [-1.081]	-0.00468 [-0.188]
Bridging_j			-0.475** [-2.094]			-0.406 [-1.454]	-0.639** [-2.357]
Bridging_ij Bridging_j			0.0253 [0.0954]			-0.109 [-0.359]	-0.132 [-0.440]
Fam_ij				-0.0307 [-0.422]		-0.00350 [-0.0473]	-0.0262 [-0.359]
Fam_j				-0.169 [-0.748]		-0.203 [-0.867]	-0.184 [-0.778]
Fam_ij Fam_j				0.840 [1.428]		0.601 [0.940]	0.760 [1.190]
Avg_C_ij					0.0729** [2.392]	0.0908*** [2.775]	
Avg_C_j					-0.130 [-1.119]	-0.0480 [-0.352]	
Avg_C_ij Avg_C_j					0.311*** [3.167]	0.294*** [2.638]	
Trust	0.0501*** [3.018]	0.0514*** [3.092]	0.0510*** [3.011]	0.0561*** [3.257]	0.0448*** [2.674]	0.0488*** [2.694]	0.0554*** [3.116]
Trust_Net	0.0266 [0.578]	0.0311 [0.684]	0.0235 [0.509]	0.00488 [0.105]	0.0203 [0.441]	0.00179 [0.0371]	0.0216 [0.451]
Cooperation	-0.0243 [-0.757]	-0.0227 [-0.712]	-0.0206 [-0.625]	-0.0220 [-0.660]	-0.0218 [-0.677]	-0.0160 [-0.472]	-0.0166 [-0.491]
Coop_Net	-0.0995** [-2.054]	-0.102** [-2.110]	-0.101** [-2.025]	-0.103** [-2.010]	-0.108** [-2.249]	-0.106** [-2.008]	-0.113** [-2.107]
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	610	610	610	570	610	570	570
R-squared	0.432	0.434	0.436	0.442	0.444	0.463	0.457
Adjusted R-squared	0.406	0.409	0.411	0.415	0.417	0.428	0.422

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 26: Explaining life satisfaction (micro–macro interactions).

VARIABLES	(1) Life_Satisf	(2) Life_Satisf	(3) Life_Satisf	(4) Life_Satisf	(5) Life_Satisf	(6) Life_Satisf	(7) Life_Satisf
ln_Dij	0.482*** [3.427]				0.477*** [3.304]	0.507*** [3.322]	0.618*** [2.734]
ln_Dj	-0.509 [-1.176]				-0.598 [-1.380]	-0.418 [-0.960]	-0.542 [-0.747]
ln_Dij_ln_Dj	-0.565 [-0.837]				-0.644 [-0.946]	-0.539 [-0.748]	-0.557 [-0.641]
ln_Cij		0.111** [2.538]					-0.0432 [-0.591]
ln_Cj		-0.0384 [-0.279]					0.0644 [0.266]
ln_Cij_ln_Cj		-0.0308 [-0.450]					-0.0174 [-0.222]
Bridging_ij			-0.0133 [-0.181]			-0.0881 [-1.111]	-0.0761 [-0.971]
Bridging_j			1.202 [1.184]			0.973 [0.827]	1.185 [1.081]
Bridging_ij_Bridging_j			-0.257 [-0.307]			-0.527 [-0.615]	-0.503 [-0.576]
Fam_ij				0.202 [0.960]		0.265 [1.256]	0.230 [1.094]
Fam_j				0.961 [1.331]		1.033 [1.393]	1.075 [1.439]
Fam_ij_Fam_j				1.744 [0.919]		2.077 [1.058]	2.307 [1.174]
Avg_C_ij					0.0572 [0.620]	0.0804 [0.827]	
Avg_C_j					0.484 [1.324]	0.195 [0.467]	
Avg_C_ij_Avg_C_j					-0.0154 [-0.0472]	0.00718 [0.0220]	
Trust	-0.00113 [-0.0231]	0.00831 [0.169]	0.00355 [0.0713]	-0.0100 [-0.197]	-0.00639 [-0.130]	-0.0338 [-0.654]	-0.0288 [-0.557]
Trust_Net	-0.165 [-1.147]	-0.178 [-1.230]	-0.221 [-1.538]	-0.235 [-1.545]	-0.180 [-1.258]	-0.213 [-1.400]	-0.207 [-1.345]
Cooperation	0.226** [2.115]	0.220** [2.027]	0.243** [2.229]	0.255** [2.282]	0.218** [2.046]	0.246** [2.231]	0.252** [2.269]
Coop_Net	0.246 [1.457]	0.242 [1.431]	0.258 [1.515]	0.358** [2.001]	0.242 [1.436]	0.357** [1.991]	0.359** [2.006]
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	936	936	936	876	936	876	876
R-squared	0.382	0.378	0.374	0.362	0.383	0.375	0.374
Adjusted R-squared	0.365	0.361	0.357	0.343	0.364	0.349	0.349

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 27: Explaining happiness (micro–macro interactions).

VARIABLES	(1) Happiness	(2) Happiness	(3) Happiness	(4) Happiness	(5) Happiness	(6) Happiness	(7) Happiness
ln_Dij	0.404*** [2.871]				0.417*** [2.929]	0.397*** [2.650]	0.386* [1.648]
ln_Dj	0.118 [0.274]				0.0439 [0.103]	0.195 [0.460]	0.919 [1.284]
ln_Dij_ln_Dj	-0.935 [-1.433]				-1.041 [-1.585]	-0.959 [-1.403]	-0.928 [-1.129]
ln_Cij		0.111*** [2.777]					0.00407 [0.0566]
ln_Cj		0.00112 [0.00829]					-0.335 [-1.448]
ln_Cij_ln_Cj		-0.0846 [-1.322]					-0.0319 [-0.396]
Bridging_ij			0.0736 [1.041]			0.0256 [0.341]	0.0110 [0.150]
Bridging_j			1.803* [1.865]			1.182 [1.108]	1.602 [1.615]
Bridging_ij_Bridging_j			-0.287 [-0.349]			-0.631 [-0.780]	-0.553 [-0.676]
Fam_ij				-0.0924 [-0.451]		-0.0729 [-0.349]	-0.0495 [-0.242]
Fam_j				1.225* [1.777]		1.338* [1.927]	1.371* [1.955]
Fam_ij_Fam_j				3.102* [1.700]		4.032** [2.127]	3.915** [2.065]
Avg_C_ij					-0.0444 [-0.507]	-0.0696 [-0.744]	
Avg_C_j					0.452 [1.223]	0.0988 [0.244]	
Avg_C_ij_Avg_C_j					-0.0659 [-0.211]	-0.0193 [-0.0626]	
Trust	0.0178 [0.357]	0.0250 [0.502]	0.0257 [0.512]	-0.00420 [-0.0820]	0.0206 [0.409]	-0.00541 [-0.103]	-0.00776 [-0.149]
Trust_Net	-0.194 [-1.202]	-0.200 [-1.234]	-0.241 [-1.505]	-0.292* [-1.713]	-0.193 [-1.203]	-0.260 [-1.500]	-0.282 [-1.628]
Cooperation	0.242** [2.277]	0.231** [2.147]	0.250** [2.329]	0.275** [2.526]	0.240** [2.255]	0.268** [2.448]	0.263** [2.400]
Coop_Net	0.198 [1.172]	0.191 [1.138]	0.195 [1.150]	0.291* [1.653]	0.199 [1.172]	0.270 [1.518]	0.275 [1.550]
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	936	936	936	876	936	876	876
R-squared	0.360	0.361	0.357	0.340	0.361	0.351	0.352
Adjusted R-squared	0.343	0.343	0.339	0.321	0.341	0.324	0.326

Notes: robust *t*-statistics in brackets. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

## C Appendix: Questionnaire (translated from the original Polish version by the authors)

I would like to talk about your relations with family, friends and acquaintances. As the term “acquaintance” may have different meanings to different people, I would like to adopt the following definition for the purposes of our conversation.

*[Interviewer: READ OUT the card with the definition of an **ACQUAINTANCE** and HAND IT to the respondent until the end of the interview. If needed, refer to the definition of an acquaintance during the interview.]*

**An ACQUAINTANCE is a person whom you know (and who knows you) by the name and whom you contact in person, over the phone or over the Internet (e-mail, social media, etc.) at least once a month. Household and family members also are acquaintances.**

**P1.** Acquaintances can be divided into various groups according to the place where you meet or the occasion at which you have first established your link. For a start, please think and name the groups which you would single out amongst your acquaintances. This card may help you in this task. If other groups come to your mind – please name them as well.

*[Interviewer: show the list of groups to the respondent - ROTATION]*

1. Acquaintances from family
2. Acquaintances from work (current or previous)
3. Acquaintances from school/college
4. Acquaintances from childhood (other than from school, e.g. from the neighborhood, common interests)
5. Acquaintances with similar interests and hobbies (sports club, gym, interests clubs, etc...)
6. Acquaintances from social, political and professional organizations (e.g., associations, scouting, local community movements, political parties, labor unions, etc...)
7. Acquaintances from the neighborhood (neighbors), from strolls (including walking the dog)
8. Acquaintances – parents of children (from kindergarten, school, playground, ...)
9. Acquaintances from church, church organizations
10. Acquaintances met via Internet, with whom we maintain regular contact (e-mail, social media, messengers, etc...)
11. Acquaintances met during excursions (excursions, pilgrimages, vacations, sanatoria)
12. Acquaintances from the military
13. Other acquaintances (*which groups?*).....

**P2.** Thinking about these groups of acquaintances [HIGHLIGHT THE GROUPS INDICATED BY THE RESPONDENT], please tell how many acquaintances did you contact in person, over the phone or Internet (e-mail, social media, messenger, skype, etc.) during the last week? Please assign each person to one selected category only, don't count anyone twice. Please give the number::

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*[ Interviewer: If the respondent cannot tell, ask:]*

I know this is a very difficult task, but please give at least an estimate.  
If the respondent still cannot provide a number, ask to pick an interval:

1. 1-4
2. 5-10
3. 11-20
4. 21-40
5. 41-80
6. 81-160
7. 161-320
8. 321-640
9. More than 640

**P3. Now, thinking not just about the last week, but more generally** – how many people make up each of the groups of acquaintances you indicated? Please recall **the definition of an acquaintance** provided at the beginning of the interview and remember to assign each person to one selected category only (no double counting):

*[Interviewer: highlight the groups of acquaintances indicated by the respondent in questions P1/2]*

1. Acquaintances from family |\_\_|\_\_|
2. Acquaintances from work (current or previous) |\_\_|\_\_|
3. Acquaintances from school/college |\_\_|\_\_|
4. Acquaintances from childhood (other than from school, e.g. from the neighborhood, common interests) |\_\_|\_\_|
5. Acquaintances with similar interests and hobbies (sports club, gym, interests clubs, etc...) |\_\_|\_\_|
6. Acquaintances from social, political and professional organizations (e.g., associations, scouting, local community movements, political parties, labor unions, etc...) |\_\_|\_\_|
7. Acquaintances from the neighborhood (neighbors), from strolls (including walking the dog) |\_\_|\_\_|
8. Acquaintances – parents of children (from kindergarten, school, playground, ...) |\_\_|\_\_|
9. Acquaintances from church, church organizations |\_\_|\_\_|
10. Acquaintances met via Internet, with whom we maintain regular contact (e-mail, social media, messengers, etc...) |\_\_|\_\_|
11. Acquaintances met during excursions (excursions, pilgrimages, vacations, sanatoria) |\_\_|\_\_|
12. Acquaintances from the military |\_\_|\_\_|
13. Other acquaintances (*which groups?*)..... |\_\_|\_\_|

*[Interviewer: If the respondent cannot tell, ask:]*

I know this is a very difficult task, but please give at least an estimate.

If the respondent still cannot provide a number, ask to pick an interval:

1. 1-4
2. 5-10
3. 11-20
4. 21-40
5. 41-80
6. 81-160
7. 161-320
8. 321-640
9. More than 640

*[Interviewer: ASK QUESTIONS P4a-P8a ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHO IN P3, POINT 1) PROVIDED A NUMBER GREATER THAN 0]*



**Now I would like to you to think only about the group of ACQUAINTANCES FROM FAMILY.**

**P4a.** How many persons from the group of **acquaintances from family** did you contact in person, over the phone or electronically (e-mail, social media, etc.):

1. Yesterday or today |\_|\_|
2. During the last 7 days |\_|\_|
3. During the last month |\_|\_|

**P5a.** Among the persons from the group of **acquaintances from family** whom you contacted during the last month, how many people have you contacted:

1. In person (meeting) |\_|\_|
2. Over the phone (sms, conversation) |\_|\_|
3. By writing letters |\_|\_|
4. By writing e-mails |\_|\_|
5. Through social media, messengers, web chats |\_|\_|
6. In other form – *write what form*.....

**P6a.** How many hours do you spend, on average, per week on keeping social contacts with **acquaintances from family**? Please give the number of hours:

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**P7a.** Please think about the last month. How many people from the group of **acquaintances from family** did you do the following things with:

1. Talk about important personal issues |\_|\_|
2. Ask for financial help |\_|\_|
3. Ask for a major favor |\_|\_|
4. Ask for help with a work-related issue, unrelated to your day-to-day professional duties, or propose cooperation on a work-related issue |\_|\_|
5. Ask for a contact or arranging a meeting with a specialist (e.g., a physician, car mechanic, etc.) |\_|\_|

**P8a.** Please tell me to which extent you agree with the following statements. Please use the following scale:

- 1 – absolutely not
- 2 – rather not
- 3 – neither yes nor no
- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

Considering the group of **acquaintances from family**:

**[Interviewer: ROTATION]**

1. I am closely emotionally related to these persons
2. I know these persons for a long time
3. I always behave honestly with these persons
4. I am convinced that these persons always behave honestly with me
5. These persons can count on my help

6. These persons can count on my help even if this would require substantial sacrifice
7. I can always on these persons' help
8. I can forgive these persons a lot
9. I have full trust towards these persons
10. I am convinced that these persons have full trust towards me

*[Interviewer: ASK QUESTIONS P4b-P8b ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHO IN P3, POINT 2) PROVIDED A NUMBER GREATER THAN 0]*

**Now I would like to you to think only about the group of ACQUAINTANCES FROM WORK.**

**P4b.** How many persons from the group of acquaintances from work did you contact in person, over the phone or electronically (e-mail, social media, etc.):

1. Yesterday or today |\_|\_|
2. During the last 7 days |\_|\_|
3. During the last month |\_|\_|

**P5b.** Among the persons from the group of acquaintances from work whom you contacted during the last month, how many people have you contacted:

1. In person (meeting) |\_|\_|
2. Over the phone (sms, conversation) |\_|\_|
3. By writing letters |\_|\_|
4. By writing e-mails |\_|\_|
5. Through social media, messengers, web chats |\_|\_|
6. In other form – *write what form*.....

**P6b.** How many hours do you spend, on average, per week on keeping social contacts with acquaintances from work? Please give the number of hours:

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**P7b.** Please think about the last month. How many people from the group of acquaintances from work did you do the following things with:

1. Talk about important personal issues |\_|\_|
2. Ask for financial help |\_|\_|
3. Ask for a major favor |\_|\_|
4. Ask for help with a work-related issue, unrelated to your day-to-day professional duties, or propose cooperation on a work-related issue |\_|\_|
5. Ask for a contact or arranging a meeting with a specialist (e.g., a physician, car mechanic, etc.) |\_|\_|

**P8b.** Please tell me to which extent you agree with the following statements. Please use the following scale:

- 1 – absolutely not  
2 – rather not

- 3 – neither yes nor no
- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

Considering the group of **acquaintances from work:**

**[Interviewer: ROTATION]**

1. I am closely emotionally related to these persons
2. I know these persons for a long time
3. I always behave honestly with these persons
4. I am convinced that these persons always behave honestly with me
5. These persons can count on my help
6. These persons can count on my help even if this would require substantial sacrifice
7. I can always on these persons' help
8. I can forgive these persons a lot
9. I have full trust towards these persons
10. I am convinced that these persons have full trust towards me

*[Interviewer: ASK QUESTIONS P4c-P8c ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHO IN P3, POINTS 3-16) PROVIDED A NUMBER GREATER THAN 0]*

**Now I would like to you to think about the group of ALL OTHER ACQUAINTANCES (NOT FROM FAMILY OR FROM WORK).**

**P4c.** How many persons from the group of **other acquaintances** did you contact in person, over the phone or electronically (e-mail, social media, etc.):

1. Yesterday or today |\_|\_|
2. During the last 7 days |\_|\_|
3. During the last month |\_|\_|

**P5c.** Among the persons from the group of **other acquaintances** whom you contacted during the last month, how many people have you contacted:

1. In person (meeting) |\_|\_|
2. Over the phone (sms, conversation) |\_|\_|
3. By writing letters |\_|\_|
4. By writing e-mails |\_|\_|
5. Through social media, messengers, web chats |\_|\_|
6. In other form – *write what form*.....

**P6c.** How many hours do you spend, on average, per week on keeping social contacts with **other acquaintances**? Please give the number of hours:

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**P7c.** Please think about the last month. How many people from the group of **other acquaintances** did you do the following things with:

1. Talk about important personal issues |\_|\_|
2. Ask for financial help |\_|\_|
3. Ask for a major favor |\_|\_|
4. Ask for help with a work-related issue, unrelated to your day-to-day professional duties, or propose cooperation on a work-related issue |\_|\_|
5. Ask for a contact or arranging a meeting with a specialist (e.g., a physician, car mechanic, etc.) |\_|\_|

**P8c.** Please tell me to which extent you agree with the following statements. Please use the following scale:

- 1 – absolutely not
- 2 – rather not
- 3 – neither yes nor no
- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

Considering the group of **other acquaintances**:

**[Interviewer: ROTATION]**

1. I am closely emotionally related to these persons
2. I know these persons for a long time
3. I always behave honestly with these persons
4. I am convinced that these persons always behave honestly with me
5. These persons can count on my help
6. These persons can count on my help even if this would require substantial sacrifice
7. I can always on these persons' help
8. I can forgive these persons a lot
9. I have full trust towards these persons
10. I am convinced that these persons have full trust towards me

**P9.** Please compare the following diagrams of networks of acquaintances.


*[Interviewer: please hand the cards with figures to the respondent.]*

Please assess whether your network of acquaintances resembles rather network A or rather network B. In the figures, you are marked with the black dot, your acquaintances – with white dots, and the relationships – with lines.

In your assessment, please use the following scale:

- 1 – absolutely network A,
- 2 – rather network A,
- 3 – partly network A, partly network B,
- 4 – rather network B,
- 5 – absolutely network B

6 – *difficult to say*



Now we would like to know the degree to which your group of acquaintances is durable, and the degree to which it changes over time. We are interested in the acquaintances whom you learned to know relatively recently, and whom you contact at least once a month, and in the ones with whom you used to contact at least once a month but now the contact is broken.

**P10.** How many new acquaintances did you learn to know during the last:

1. 3 months
2. 1 year
3. 3 years

**P11.** The following questions pertain to your new acquaintances (contacts forged during the last 3 years). Please assess to which extent you agree with the following statements. Please use the following scale:

- 1 – absolutely not
- 2 – rather not
- 3 – neither yes nor no
- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

1. Contacting these people gives me pleasure, brings me in a good mood
2. Contacting these people may help me in my work-related issues
3. It was my initiative to forge these contacts
4. I was contacted with these people by third persons
5. Contacting these people may help me forge contacts with someone else.

**P12.** Using a scale where:

- 1 – absolutely not
- 2 – rather not
- 3 – neither yes nor no

- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

Please tell if forging new contacts, from your side:

1. Requires to give up some other activities (work, leisure)
2. Requires to neglect some of the earlier acquaintances
3. Is financially costly
4. Is the easier, the greater is the number of people with whom you have already known because it provides more opportunities for common contacts

**P13.** With how many persons have you lost contact during the last:

1. 3 months |\_\_|\_\_|
2. 1 year |\_\_|\_\_|
3. 3 years |\_\_|\_\_|

**And now please think about yourself.**

**P14.** Please tell to which extent the following statements refer to you. Please use the following scale in your assessment:

- 1 – absolutely does not refer to me
- 2 – rather does not refer to me
- 3 – neither refers nor does not refer to me
- 4 – rather refers to me
- 5 – absolutely refers to me

6 – *difficult to say*

1. I am a sociable person, I am glad to spend time with my acquaintances
2. I am an open person, curious of the world
3. I am valued at work
4. I know many persons who have useful skills
5. I know many persons who can help me “get things done”
6. I am a person who may help others find a job or solve a difficult work-related problem
7. I have helped (at least) one of my acquaintances find a job or solve a difficult work-related problem

**P15.** How often do the following events take place in your life? In your assessment please use the following scale:

- 1 – never,
- 2 – rarely,
- 3 – sometimes,
- 4 – often,
- 5 – very often

1. You arrange a contact between two people you know but who have not known each other before (e.g., contacting your acquaintances from work with your other acquaintances who may help them)?

2. You share information obtained from your acquaintances with your other acquaintances from a different group (e.g., passing the information you got from your colleagues at work to your family)?
3. You share information about persons looking for a job, job offers or business opportunities, with your acquaintances?

**P16.** How many times in your life have you changed:

Please name the number of such events.

*[Interviewer: If the respondent has not worked yet, put a 0 in points 3 and 4]*

1. Town of residence |\_|\_|  
ASK IF THE ANSWER TO PT 1 IS ABOVE 0:
2. Town of residence, moving to a place more than 100 km away |\_|\_|
3. Workplace / employer |\_|\_|
4. Occupation |\_|\_|

**P17.** Using the scale where:

- 1 – never,
- 2 – rarely,
- 3 – sometimes,
- 4 – often,
- 5 – very often

In the case of acquaintances with whom you lost contact during the last 3 years please assess how often the respective situations took place:

*[Interviewer: ROTATION]*

1. Contact with these persons ceased to please me, started to bring me in a bad mood
2. These persons let down my trust
3. It was my own initiative to break these contacts
4. I regret that the contact was broken
5. I don't know why the contact was broken
6. Contact was broken because we had no time to sustain it
7. Contact was broken due to a change of place of residence
8. These were mostly short-lived, shallow contacts
9. Contact was broken with an acquaintance whom I knew since childhood
10. Contact was broken because these persons got ill
11. These persons died

**P18.** Do you think that you have:

1. Clearly too few acquaintances
2. Probably too few acquaintances
3. An adequate number of acquaintances
4. Probably too many acquaintances
5. Clearly too many acquaintances

**P19.** Using a scale where:

- 1 – absolutely not
- 2 – rather not

- 3 – neither yes nor no
- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

Do you think that keeping contacts with your acquaintances:

- 1. Is time-consuming
- 2. Lowers your engagement in work
- 3. Takes place at the cost of time which you would otherwise spend on leisure
- 4. Costs a lot of money
- 5. Is financially beneficial for you

**P20.** Have you ever **found a job** thanks to the intermediation of one of your acquaintances?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. *I don't know, difficult to say*

**P21.** Do you sometimes **save money** thanks to information obtained from your acquaintances (e.g., when making purchasing decisions)?

- 1. never,
- 2. rarely,
- 3. sometimes,
- 4. often,
- 5. very often

**P22.** Do you sometimes **save time** thanks to information obtained from your acquaintances?

- 1. never,
- 2. rarely,
- 3. sometimes,
- 4. often,
- 5. very often

**P23.** Are you engage in the activities of some organization or association? Please assess your engagement:

- 1. no membership
- 2. membership only
- 3. small engagement
- 4. large engagement
- 5. very large engagement

**P24.** Using a scale where:

- 1 – absolutely not
- 2 – rather not
- 3 – neither yes nor no
- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

Please tell if among your acquaintances with whom you keep most frequent contact (excluding your partner, parents and children) there are many:



1. persons of opposite gender than you
2. persons of a very different age than you
3. persons of a different level of educational attainment than you
4. persons with different interests than you
5. persons with a different worldview than you
6. persons living far from you
7. persons who are substantially richer or poorer than you
8. persons from a distant family

**P25.** Are you disabled?

*[Interviewer: We ask for respondents' own assessment, we do not expect any formal confirmation of disability].*

1. Yes
2. No

**P26.** Are you chronically ill which makes professional work difficult or impossible?

1. Yes
2. No

**P27.** What is the character of your current work?

1. Physical, blue-collar work
2. White-collar work
3. *I am not employed -> pass to question P32*

*[Interviewer: Questions P28, P29, P30, P31 should be asked only to respondents who are professionally active, i.e. the ones who picked 1 or 2 in question P27]*

**P28.** How many years have you been professionally active?

*[Interviewer: please provide the number of years]*

□□□

**P29.** How many years have you been working at your current occupation?

*[Interviewer: please provide the number of years]*

□□□

**P30.** Does your work require intensive cooperation with other people?

- 1 – absolutely not
- 2 – rather not
- 3 – neither yes nor no
- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

**P31.** Do you think your material situation is satisfactory?

- 1 – absolutely not
- 2 – rather not
- 3 – neither yes nor no
- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

**P32.** Do you think your material situation is above or below the average standard of living of your peers in Poland?

- 1. Clearly below
- 2. Rather below
- 3. Neither above nor below
- 4. Rather above
- 5. Clearly above

**P33.** Do you think your incomes are satisfactory?

- 1 – absolutely not
- 2 – rather not
- 3 – neither yes nor no
- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

**P34.** Do you think your incomes are above or below the average income of your peers in Poland?

- 1. Clearly below
- 2. Rather below
- 3. Neither above nor below
- 4. Rather above
- 5. Clearly above

**P35.** Please place your incomes at the scale from 1 to 10 where 1 denotes lowest incomes, 5 – average incomes, and 10 – highest incomes.

*[Commentary for the interviewer: this question has a scale from 1 to 10 because we intend to capture the deciles of the income distribution]*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Lowest incomes				Average incomes					Highest incomes

**P36.** Do you feel that you have the choice and control over your life?

- 1 – absolutely not
- 2 – rather not
- 3 – neither yes nor no
- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

**P37.** Do you think that most people could be trusted, or one couldn't be too careful with other people?

1. Clearly one couldn't be too careful with other people,
2. One should rather be careful with other people,
3. It's difficult to say,
4. One should rather trust other people,
5. Clearly most people could be trusted

**P38.** To which extent are you satisfied with your current life? Please make an assessment on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means "very dissatisfied" and 10 – "very satisfied".

0 I am very dissatisfied	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 I am very satisfied
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**P39.** To which extent would you call yourself a happy person? Please make an assessment on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means "very unhappy" and 10 – "very happy".

0 I am very unhappy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 I am very happy
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**P40.** Please tell me to which extent you agree with the following statements. Please use the following scale:

- 1 – absolutely not
- 2 – rather not
- 3 – neither yes nor no
- 4 – rather yes
- 5 – absolutely yes

1. I behave honestly with strangers
2. I am convinced that strangers behave honestly with me
3. I am convinced that strangers are typically honest with themselves
4. Rules are for people to break them
5. Rules may be broken when no one controls if they are obeyed
6. Rules may be broken when it does not harm others
7. All rules should be obeyed
8. To achieve success in life, one has to bend the rules
9. Big money cannot be earned honestly