Although a Condorcet winner commands a majority in its favor, there is no guarantee of unanimity. In a Lindahl equilibrium, a suitably chosen system of personalized transfers and prices ensures unanimity, but there is no ...

We consider a repeated principal-agent model, where a single agent exhibits problems of self control modelled using Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) type temptation preferences. In such a setting, for a parameterized strength ...

For a strong set order increasing (resp., strongly monotone) upper order hemicontinuous correspondence mapping a complete lattice A into itself (resp., a sigma-complete lattice into itself), we provide conditions for tight ...

Over the last few years, ranking lists of academic journals have become one of the key indicators for evaluating individual researchers, departments and universities. How to optimally design such rankings? What can we learn ...

We give a set of sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a time-consistent Markov stationary consumption policy for a quasi-hyperbolic household under uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, this uniqueness result is ...

We consider the efficiency of a mechanism for incentivising publication in academic journals where a research supervisory body awards points for papers that appear in quality publications. Building on the principal-agent ...

For an increasing upper order hemi-continuous correspondence F selfmapping sigma-complete lattice A, we first provide tight fixed-point bounds for sufficiently large iterations on F starting from any initial point a in A. ...

This paper reevaluates the complementary symmetry hypothesis and the supporting experimental evidence. Originally the hypothesis was stated for binary risky prospects. We generalize the hypothesis to arbitrary state-contingent ...

We prove existence of time consistent equilibria in a wide class of dynamic models with recursive payoffs and generalized discounting involving both behavioral and normative applica-tions. Our generalized Bellman equation ...

We provide general theoretical foundations for modeling strategic uncertainty in large distributional Bayesian games with general type spaces, using a version of interim correlated rationalizability. We then focus on the ...