(Belief in) life after death impacts the utility of life before it - a difference in preferences or an artefact?
dc.contributor.author | Jakubczyk, Michał | |
dc.contributor.author | Golicki, Dominik | |
dc.contributor.author | Niewada, Maciej | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-07-21T04:46:08Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-07-21T04:46:08Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-04 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Jakubczyk M., Golicki D., Niewada M., (Belief in) life after death impacts the utility of life before it - a difference in preferences or an artefact? , KAE Working Papers, 2016, nr 2016-007, s. 1-18 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12182/1087 | |
dc.description.abstract | In most of the religions the preservation of own, God-given, life is obligatory. The time-trade-off method (TTO) forces to voluntarily forego life years. We verify if this is a problem for the religious and how it impacts the TTO results. We used the data from the only EQ-5D valuation in Poland (2008, three-level, 321 respondents, 23 states each) a very religious (mostly catholic) country. We used the belief in afterlife question to measure the religiosity on two levels: strong (definitely yes) and some (also rather yes), both about a third of the sample. The religious on average (yet, not statistically significant) spend more time doing TTO and consider it more difficult. The religious more often are non-traders: odds ratio (OR)=1.97 (strongly), OR=1.55 (rather); and less often consider a state worse-than-death: OR=0.67 (strongly), OR=0.81 (rather). These associations are statistically significant (p< 0.001) and hold when controlling for possible confounders. Strong religiosity abates the utility loss: in the additive approach by 0.136, in the multiplicative approach by the factor of 2.08 (both p< 0.001). Removing the effect of religiosity from the value set reduces the utility by 0.046 on average. The impact of religiosity seems to be a TTO-artefact rather than a true difference in preferences (testing this requires further analysis of, e.g., discrete-choice or visual analogue scale data). Non-Weltanschauung-biased estimates should rather be used in cost-utility analysis to drive resource allocation. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.rights | Dozwolony użytek | * |
dc.subject | Health-related quality of life | en |
dc.subject | Utility | en |
dc.subject | Preference elicitation | en |
dc.subject | Time trade-off | en |
dc.subject | Religion | en |
dc.subject | Life after death | en |
dc.subject.classification | I10 | en |
dc.subject.classification | C25 | en |
dc.subject.classification | N30 | en |
dc.subject.classification | I31 | en |
dc.title | (Belief in) life after death impacts the utility of life before it - a difference in preferences or an artefact? | en |
dc.type | workingPaper | en |
dc.description.number | 2016-007 | en |
dc.description.physical | 1-18 | en |
dc.description.series | SGH KAE Working Papers Series | en |
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