Lindhal meets Condorcet?
dc.contributor.author | Ghosal, Sayantan | |
dc.contributor.author | Woźny, Łukasz | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-10-21T06:55:40Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-10-21T06:55:40Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024-09 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Ghosal S., Woźny Ł., Lindhal meets Condorcet?, SGH KAE Working Papers, 2024, nr 2024/101 , s. 1-29 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12182/1301 | |
dc.description.abstract | Although a Condorcet winner commands a majority in its favor, there is no guarantee of unanimity. In a Lindahl equilibrium, a suitably chosen system of personalized transfers and prices ensures unanimity, but there is no guarantee of a majority vote in its favor. Do Lindahl equilibria decentralize Condorcet winners? In a setting where voters' preferences are satiated, characterized by bliss points, this paper proposes a new balancedness condition which is satisfied when a Condorcet winner lies within the interior of the convex hull of voters' bliss points. We show that such a political compromise between the most preferred policies of different voter types can be decentralized as Lindahl equilibria. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.rights | Dozwolony użytek | * |
dc.subject | Bliss points | en |
dc.subject | Condorcet winner | en |
dc.subject | Lindhal equilibria | en |
dc.subject | balancedness | en |
dc.subject.classification | D50 | en |
dc.subject.classification | D61 | en |
dc.subject.classification | D71 | en |
dc.title | Lindhal meets Condorcet? | en |
dc.type | workingPaper | en |
dc.description.number | 2024/101 | en |
dc.description.physical | 1-19 | en |
dc.description.series | SGH KAE Working Papers Series | en |
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