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dc.contributor.authorGhosal, Sayantan
dc.contributor.authorWoźny, Łukasz
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-21T06:55:40Z
dc.date.available2024-10-21T06:55:40Z
dc.date.issued2024-09
dc.identifier.citationGhosal S., Woźny Ł., Lindhal meets Condorcet?, SGH KAE Working Papers, 2024, nr 2024/101 , s. 1-29en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12182/1301
dc.description.abstractAlthough a Condorcet winner commands a majority in its favor, there is no guarantee of unanimity. In a Lindahl equilibrium, a suitably chosen system of personalized transfers and prices ensures unanimity, but there is no guarantee of a majority vote in its favor. Do Lindahl equilibria decentralize Condorcet winners? In a setting where voters' preferences are satiated, characterized by bliss points, this paper proposes a new balancedness condition which is satisfied when a Condorcet winner lies within the interior of the convex hull of voters' bliss points. We show that such a political compromise between the most preferred policies of different voter types can be decentralized as Lindahl equilibria.en
dc.language.isoen
dc.rightsDozwolony użytek*
dc.subjectBliss pointsen
dc.subjectCondorcet winneren
dc.subjectLindhal equilibriaen
dc.subjectbalancednessen
dc.subject.classificationD50en
dc.subject.classificationD61en
dc.subject.classificationD71en
dc.titleLindhal meets Condorcet?en
dc.typeworkingPaperen
dc.description.number2024/101en
dc.description.physical1-19en
dc.description.seriesSGH KAE Working Papers Seriesen


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